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IS REVLON ONLY COSMETIC?: STRUCTURING A MERGER
IN THE MID-1990s
ALEXANDER B. JOHNSON
INTRODUCrION
The fiduciary duties of a board of directors under the Delaware
Supreme Court's landmark opinion in Revlon, Inc v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings' have been, for almost a decade, the subject of wide-
spread controversy.2 Now, in the mid-1990s, the Delaware Supreme
Court has removed much of the ambiguity in Delaware takeover law3
generated by the Revlon opinion. As a result, what a board may or
may not do in structuring a merger transaction has been clarified
considerably.4
Normally, under Delaware law, a board of directors manages the
business and affairs of every corporation.5 In exercising these powers,
Delaware law gives boards broad discretion and generally protects
their actions by "the business judgment rule."6 When responding to a
takeover bid, however, boards lose some of this discretion, and courts
subject directors to an enhanced scrutiny before the protections of the
business judgment rule are conferred? Moreover, in some circum-
stances, a court even may force a board to abandon its desired plans
for a company and seek a new transaction, focusing solely on ob-
taining the best value for the shareholders. Such was the case in
Revlon.'
In Revlon, during a bidding contest for control of the Revlon Cor-
poration, events transpired that caused the "break-up" of the com-
pany to become "inevitable." 9 Looking at those events, the Delaware
Supreme Court concluded that "the duty of the [Revlon] board had
thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to
1. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
2. See infra notes 21, 36, 79.
3. Delaware is the domicile of more than half of the Fortune 500 companies and
more than 40% of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. See Lewis
D. Solomon et al., Corporations Law and Policy 6 (3d ed. 1994). Therefore, this Note
is concerned only with Delaware law.
4. See infra part I.
5. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
6. The business judgment rule is a presumption that directors, in fulfilling their
duties, acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the best interests of the com-
pany. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (DeL 1984). Under the rule, a board's
actions will be upheld if they can be attributed to "any rational business purpose."
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del. 1971). For further discussion on
the business judgment rule, see infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
8. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 181-82
(Del. 1986).
9. Id at 182.
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the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockhold-
ers' benefit."' 10 In other words, in the sale of the company, Revlon's
board became obliged to act as "auctioneers," charged with getting
the best price for the company." As a result, fiduciary duties that
require a board to seek a transaction that obtains the best value for
the shareholders, regardless of the board's own plans'for the corpora-
tion, have been termed a board's "Revlon duties."'"
When a board's Revlon duties apply, that board loses much of its
discretion because its new objective becomes a narrow one of ob-
taining "the best value reasonably available to the stockholders."' 3
Originally, when Revlon duties applied, many practitioners thought
that these duties required a board to auction the company to the high-
est bidder. 4 As a result, a board obviously would wish to avoid any
scenario that would require it to put the company on the auction
block and sell the company to an entity it disliked. The cases follow-
ing Revlon, however, have clarified that the fiduciary duties enunci-
ated in that case are not as "radical"'15 as they originally may have
seemed.' 6 There is no affirmative auction duty. Instead, Revlon re-
quires that, in specific situations, a board be informed fully to ensure
that the transaction into which it is entering obtains the best value
reasonably available to the shareholders.' 7 A board may determine
the best value using various methods, such as an auction or an active
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tme Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-
51 (Del. 1989) (using the term "Revlon duties" in deciding the inapplicability of Rev-
ion duties to the merger situation in that case); QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount
Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1267 (Del. Ch. 1993) (describing what "Revlon
[diuties [e]ntail" in that case); In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholders Li-
tig., C.A. No. 11495, 1992 WL 212595, at *7-9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) (discussing
"when Revlon duties are triggered").
Nonetheless, the Delaware Supreme Court, as of late, has expressed dislike for col-
loquialisms such as "Revlon duties." See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650
A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del. 1994). Specifically, in Arnold, the plaintiff contended that
the board breached its "Revlon duties." Id. at 1289. The court acknowledged the
plaintiff's claim by stating: "Presumably, plaintiff is referring colloquially but inap-
propriately to the enhanced scrutiny courts accord to certain types of transactions
described [below]." Id. at 1289 n.40. The court went on to describe the specific cir-
cumstances when the board's "'obligation of acting reasonably to seek the transac-
tion offering the best value reasonably available to the stockholders'" applies. Id. at
1289-90 (quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d
34, 43 (Del. 1993)). In any event, this Note will use the phrase "Revlon duties" to
describe the obligation enunciated in Arnold to seek the best value reasonably avail-
able to shareholders.
13. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del.
1993).
14. See infra note 79.
15. See infra note 36.
16. See infra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
17. Barkan v. Ainsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989).
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survey of the market."8 When a board has adequate information with
which to determine best value, that alone may be enough to satisfy its
obligations under Revlon." In any event, when the duties in Revlon
do not apply, there is no affirmative duty to seek a transaction that
obtains the best value reasonably available to shareholders. Rather,
Delaware law gives a board broad discretion in exercising its powers2 0
As a result, boards often strive to avoid the specific situations that
trigger Revlon.
For some time after the Revlon decision, it remained unclear pre-
cisely which situations triggered a board's Revlon duties and, if trig-
gered, precisely what such duties entailed.21 Currently, in the mid-
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
21. Indeed, some commentators argue that Revlon duties no longer exist under
Delaware law. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduci-
ary Duty Law After QVC And Technicolor A Unified Standard (and the End of Rev-
Ion Duties?), 49 Bus. Law. 1593 (1994). Professors Cunningham and Yablon argue
that Delaware law has evolved into a new standard, requiring enhanced scrutiny to
ensure that management actions achieve the best value reasonably available to share-
holders, that will apply to all management actions in takeover situations and that Rev-
lon duties to sell a company to the highest bidder no longer exist. Id. at 1595-96. Part
of their statement that Revlon duties no longer exist, however, may be only a matter
of semantics. They state that "the so-called 'Revlon duty'-an affirmative legal obli-
gation to conduct a fair auction for the company and to sell it to the highest bidder-
no longer exists under Delaware law." I& at 1595 (citation omitted).
By contrast, while what Professors Cunningham and Yablon term Revlon duties
may have been those duties imposed by the court in Revlon, what since has been
termed a board's Revlon duties are a set of fiduciary duties that have evolved in Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (DeL 1988), Barkan v. Amsted
Indus., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989), Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune Inc., 571
A.2d 1140 (DeL 1989), and Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34 (DeL 1993). Unlike the description of Revlon duties by Professors Cun-
ningham and Yablon, the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly has concluded that Rev-
Ion does not require a board to conduct an auction. See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286-87.
Rather, what have been termed Revlon duties now require a board to obtain the best
value reasonably available for the stockholders. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 46. Further,
subsequent Delaware case law explicitly supports the existence of Revlon duties after
QVC. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994). In
Arnold, the Delaware Supreme Court specifically discussed the applicability of Rev-
Ion in a takeover situation. Id While the court expressed dislike for the colloquialism
"Revlon duties," id. at 1289 n.40, it understood the reference to Revlon duties as
describing a distinct set of circumstances that implicate a board's duty to "'seek the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the stockholders.'" Id. at
1290 (quoting QVC, 637 A.2d at 43). Indeed, while Professors Cunningham and
Yablon argue that this duty applies to all takeover situations, the Arnold court found
that such a duty applies only in certain distinct circumstances and, actually, did not
apply to the takeover situation at hand. Id. at 1289-90.
Thus, the fiduciary duties enunciated in Revlon still exist under Delaware law.
Rather than argue that Revlon duties are extinct, it is seems better to understand
Revlon duties as requiring a board to obtain the best value reasonably available for
shareholders. Further, despite the Arnold court's displeasure towards the colloquial-
ism "Revlon duties," Delaware courts on various occasions have referred, and con-
tinue to refer, to such duties as Revlon duties. See supra note 12.
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1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court has delineated the circumstances
that trigger a board's obligation to seek the best value reasonably
available for shareholders.za Generally speaking, a board's Revlon
duties apply when a transaction has the possibility of resulting in the
"break-up" of a company or when the board facilitates a "sale or
change of control" of the corporation.2 3 The break-up standard
plainly derives from Revlon itself.2 4 Further, the Delaware Supreme
Court, since Revlon, has provided specific examples as to what consti-
tutes a "break-up."'  The change-in-control standard, however, is a
product of the evolution of Revlon's progeny and is more ambigu-
ous.26 Indeed, one commentator asserted that "'[t]he idea of a
change in control is one of the most ill-defined terms in corporate
takeover law.' "27
A simplified version of the facts of a recent case, American General
Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc.,' illustrates some of the nuances in the change-
in-control test. In that case, Unitrin's board responded to an unsolic-
ited bid by implementing, among other things, a repurchase plan. 9
The plaintiffs asserted that the plan would increase the combined
holdings of Unitrin's board in the company from twenty-three percent
of the shares of Unitrin to twenty-eight percent.3 0 Because Unitrin's
certificate of incorporation provided that a merger must be approved
by seventy-five percent of the shareholders, the plaintiffs contended
that this "Insider Group" of board members would have veto power
over any merger proposal. 31 Plaintiffs therefore argued that this in-
crease of the "Insider Group's" stake in Unitrin constituted a change
in control that, under Revlon, required the board to seek a transaction
that maximized shareholder value.32
22. See infra text accompanying note 279.
23. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 42-43, 47; see also Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1289-90 (apply-
ing and clarifying the Revlon tests enunciated in QVC).
24. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (finding that as "the break-up of the company was inevitable... [t]he duty of
the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to
the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit" (em-
phasis added)).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
26. See infra parts I.B.2-I.C.
27. Arthur Buckler & Greg Steinmetz, Unitrin is Sued by American General
Corp., Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1994, at A4 (quoting Professor Lawrence Cunningham,
Cardozo Law School).
28. Civ. A. Nos. 13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994), rev'd on
other grounds, No. 418, 1994, 1995 WL 12461 (Del. Jan. 11, 1995).
29. Id. at *1. Under the repurchase plan, Unitrin would repurchase 10 million of
its shares on the open market.
30. Id at *3.
31. Id
32. It at *5. One possibility they surely must have hoped for would be a sale of
Unitrin to American General, which made an offer for the company that represented
a 30% premium above the market price. See id. at *1.
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The facts of Unitrin raise some common questions. For example,
can a board's repurchase plan trigger Revlon? Should the mere power
to block a merger constitute a change in control? Does owning
twenty-eight percent of a company constitute control? Does a con-
trolling group qualify, or must a single shareholder possess control of
the company? Courts since Revlon have answered some of these
questions. In addition, ways in which a board may avoid Revlon du-
ties have been clarified. Recent caselaw suggests that a board can
structure a transaction to avoid the type of change-in-control situation
likely to trigger Revlon by ensuring that ownership of the post-merger
entity remains widely held or by limiting the power of the resulting
controlling shareholder. In any event, in light of recent court deci-
sions, doubt as to the state of Revlon duties, 3 and the current resur-
gence in mergers and acquisitions, the subject of a board's enhanced
duties under Revlon demands revisiting.
This Note addresses those situations that trigger a board's Revlon
duties and argues that, despite Revlon duties, Delaware law allows
boards some flexibility in structuring a merger. Indeed, the distinct
circumstances that trigger Revlon are better delineated in the mid-
1990s than ever before. This Note examines Revlon duties and pro-
vides guidance to corporate planners, giving them room to structure a
transaction without concern over inadvertently triggering Revlon.
Part I of this Note shows how Revlon has evolved from its original
state as an auction duty to requiring only that a board is informed
fully in choosing a transaction that obtains the best value reasonably
available for shareholders. Part I also examines those lessons learned
from the evolution of the Revlon standard, with particular focus on
when Revlon is triggered. Part II discusses the Revlon standard as
interpreted in the mid-1990s, with specific emphasis on the Delaware
Supreme Court's decisions in Paramount Communications Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc.35 and its progeny. Part III provides guidance'as to
when Revlon duties will be triggered and how they can be avoided.
Specifically, part Ill illustrates how, after QVC, a board most effec-
tively may avoid the type of change in control likely to trigger Revlon
in two scenarios: by implementing structural devices for the protec-
tion of minority shareholders or by structuring a transaction so that
the post-merger entity is without a controlling shareholder. Because a
board could utilize these tactics in a wide variety of merger situations,
the threat of Revlon in the mid-1990s may be, in reality, only cosmetic.
33. See supra note 21.
34. Last year, 1994, saw the largest dollar value of mergers ever recorded in a
year-beating out the previous record set in 1988. Greg Steinmetz, Review of Fi-
nance: Mergers and Acquisitions Set Records, But Activity Lacked That '80s Pizzazz,
Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at R8.
35. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
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I. TIE EVOLUTION OF REVLON DUTIES AND LESSONS LEARNED
THEREFROM
Despite the importance of Revlon duties, courts normally do not
impose those duties upon a board.36 Because a board manages the
business and affairs of a corporation,37 courts generally defer to a
board's actions and review those actions only under the business judg-
ment rule.3" When Revlon duties apply, however, boards have less
freedom as specific duties are imposed on them. The cases interpret-
ing Revlon illustrate how those duties have evolved, when they apply,
and their importance in merger situations.
A. The Business Judgment Rule, Unocal, and Revlon
The business judgment rule is a "presumption that in making a busi-
ness decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed ba-
sis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company."39 The rule entitles a board to great
deference and precludes a court from unreasonably imposing itself in
the business and affairs of a corporation.40 For a party challenging a
board's actions to overcome the powerful presumptions of the busi-
ness judgment rule, that party must prove that the board's actions
were either uninformed, in bad faith, or not in the best interests of the
company.4' Only if such a showing is made will the court scrutinize
the "entire fairness" of the transaction.42 If a challenging party cannot
36. Indeed, one court and several commentators even have referred to the duties
imposed in Revlon as "radical." See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tine, Inc.,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,279 (Del. Ch.), aff'd,
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Ronald J. Rinaldi, Note, Radically Altered States: Entering
the "Revlon Zone," 90 Colum. L. Rev. 760, 762 (1990) (describing Revlon duties as
"radical"); Theodore N. Mirvis, What Triggers "Revlon"? Some New Answers,
N.Y.LJ., Dec. 3, 1990, at 5-6 ("Revlon is [a] 'radically altered state.' ").
37. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). In exercising these powers, "directors
are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corpora-
tion and to act in the best interests of its shareholders." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (citations omitted).
38. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). For a thorough treatment of
the business judgment rule, see generally Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judg-
ment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors (4th ed. 1993).
39. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
40. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
41. Idi at 361 ("To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of
providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any
one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care.").
42. Id If a challenging party can rebut any of the presumptions of the businessjudgment rule, the directors then have the burden of proving the "entire fairness" of
the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff. Id Under the "entire fairness" standard,
the directors must show that "the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and
fair price." Id.
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prove any of these elements, the court will uphold a board's decision if
it can be "'attributed to any rational business purpose.' ,43
The presumptions of the business judgment rule apply in the con-
text of a takeover.' The rule operates to protect directors' decisions
and prevent courts from second-guessing a board's business judg-
ments.45 Nonetheless, in some situations a court will impose specific
obligations upon a board, such as those mandated by Revlon.46 Fur-
ther, in evaluating a board's response to a hostile takeover bid, courts
apply an enhanced scrutiny before allowing directors the deference
entitled to them under the business judgment rule. One such situation
occurred in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
4 1
1. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
In Unocal, Mesa Petroleum Co., a reputed "greenmailer," made
an unsolicited, ,coercive, two-tiered tender offer49 for Unocal. After
lengthy discussions and opinions from its financial advisors, the Uno-
cal board rejected the offer as "inadequate. '50 The board then, as a
defensive measure, decided to make a self-tender that excluded the
bidder, Mesa, from tendering its shares.51
43. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del 1985) (quoting
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del 1971)) ("A hallmark of the busi-
ness judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board
if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business purpose.' "); see also
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (DeL 1993) ("If a shareholder
plaintiff fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches to
protect corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make, and our courts
will not second-guess these business judgments.").
44. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., No. 418, 1994, 1995 WVL 12461, at *7
(Del. Jan. 11, 1995) (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984)); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
45. See Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 360.
46. See id. at 361 ("[I]n the review of a transaction involving a sale of a company,
the directors have the burden of establishing that the price offered was the highest
value reasonably available under the circumstances.").
47. 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
48. The term "greenmail" refers to the practice of a target company's "buying out
a takeover bidder's stock at a premium that is not available to other shareholders in
order to prevent the takeover." Id. at 956 n.13.
49. Id. at 949. Mesa, the owner of 13% of Unocal's stock, offered $54 cash for
approximately 37% of Unocal's outstanding stock, the "front-end." Id. The "back-
end" of the two-tiered offer was comprised of "junk bonds," which Mesa determined
were worth far less than $54 per share. Id. at 956. The Unocal court found that such
offers are coercive and thus a threat, in that they are "designed to stampede share-
holders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of
what they will receive at the back end of the transaction." Id.
50. Id. at 949.
51. Specifically, the resolution provided that if Mesa's stake in Unocal increased
to 51%, Unocal would buy the remaining 49% of outstanding shares for an exchange
of debt securities having an aggregate par value of $72 per share. I&a t 951. More-
over, the resolution excluded Mesa from tendering its shares, because if Mesa were
permitted to do so, it would defeat the resolution's purpose of adequately compensat-
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In upholding the Unocal board's actions, the court fashioned a two-
pronged enhanced scrutiny test for boards responding to takeover
threats.52 The court declared that, before a board will be protected by
the business judgment rule when responding to a takeover threat, the
directors must show that (1) the board had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the offer constituted a legally cognizable "danger to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness"53 and (2) the board's response was
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed. '54 This enhanced scrutiny
is necessary because of the inherent conflicts of interest that boards
face in takeover situations.
Applying the two-pronged test, the court found the board's percep-
tion of a grossly inadequate two-tiered coercive tender offer by a re-
puted greenmailer to be a reasonably perceived threat to the
corporation.5 6 The court further found that the board's response was
reasonable, in that its objective was either to defeat the inadequate
Mesa offer, or, should the offer succeed, to provide the "back end"
shareholders with a higher valued security then they would have re-
ceived from Mesa.57 Because the board made the required showing,
the business judgment rule applied. Thus, the challenging party had
to overcome the presumptions underlying the rule, which it ultimately
failed to do.59
ing the "back end" shareholders and in effect would result in Unocal's funding of
Mesa's inadequate proposal. See id.
52. See id. at 954-55.
53. I& at 955. A board satisfies this burden by showing "good faith and reason-
able investigation." Further, a board may enhance such a showing if a majority of
independent directors approves its transactions. Id.
54. Id. at 955. Such considerations may include, for example, "inadequacy of the
price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and
perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the qual-
ity of securities being offered in the exchange." Id.
55. See id. at 954. The Unocal court stated:
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to
determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is no different from any other
responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to the
respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment.
There are, however, certain caveats to a proper exercise of this function. [In
takeover situations,] [blecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests, [e.g., protecting their jobs] rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections
of the business judgment rule may be conferred.
Id. (citation omitted).
56. See id. at 956. Specifically, the court emphasized the nature of the offer and
the fact that Unocal's board was well informed. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 958-59.
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2. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings
Applying the principles of Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings' ruled that once the
break-up of a company becomes inevitable, the duty of the board be-
comes obtaining "the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company."'61 In Revlon, Revlon's board faced an unsolicited tender
offer from Pantry Pride, Inc. Revlon's board responded to this per-
ceived threat by implementing a note purchase rights plan62 and by
commencing a self-tender for up to ten million shares. 63 The self-
tender allowed each shareholder to tender his shares of common stock
for a combination of notes and preferred stock.64 The court found
these actions to be valid defensive measures under Unocal's two-pro-
nged test.65
Higher bids from Pantry Pride soon followed. In response, Rev-
lon's board agreed to a leveraged buyout proposal, with management
participation, in which Fortsman Little & Co. would acquire all of
Revlon's outstanding shares for fifty-six dollars per share in cash.6 A
bidding contest ensued, during which Pantry Pride bid $56.25 per
share and stated that it would top any offer for Revlon.67 Fortsman
then made an offer of $57.25 per share for a merger without manage-
ment participation.68 Fortsman conditioned the offer upon the receipt
of a "lock-up" option,69 a "no shop" provision,7' and a twenty-five
60. 506 A.2d 173 (DeL 1986).
61. Id. at 182.
62. Under this plan, if anyone acquired 20% of Revlon, each Revlon shareholder
would receive the right to exchange each share of common stock it owned for a $65
principal Revlon note at 12% interest, with a one year maturity. Id. at 177. The rights
were not available to the acquiror, and the Revlon board could redeem such rights.
Id
63. Id
64. Id The self-tender offer exchanged, for each share of common stock ten-
dered, one senior subordinated note of $47.50 principle at 11.75% interest, due 1995,
and one-tenth of a share of $9.00 cumulative convertible exchangeable preferred
stock valued at $100 per share. Id
65. Id. at 181. In applying Unocal, the court noted that the Revlon directors con-
cluded that Pantry Pride's offer was grossly inadequate. Id. The court found that in
reaching this conclusion, the board acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and with
reasonable grounds for believing that there existed a harmful threat to the corporate
enterprise. Id. The court then concluded that the adoption of these defensive meas-
ures were reasonable in relation to the threat posed and fully accorded with the pow-
ers, duties, and responsibilities of directors. Id.
66. Id. at 178.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id. A lockup is "a target board's promise to compensate a bidder a specified
amount if the target breaches or does not consummate its merger agreement with the
bidder." Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Yale LJ.
1739, 1742 (1994). In Revlon, the "lock-up" option would give Fortsman the right to
purchase Revlon's Vision Care and National Health Laboratories divisions for S525
million, some $100-$175 million below their estimated value, if another acquiror ob-
tained 40% of Revlon's shares. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
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million dollar "break up" fee.7' In return, Fortsman agreed to support
the par value of the issued notes, which had faltered in the market, by
issuing new notes.72 Revlon's board approved Fortsman's proposal,
and Pantry Pride brought suit.73
Looking at these events, the Delaware Supreme Court found that
the bidding reached such heights that "the break-up of the company
was inevitable." 74 The court found that the board's authorization for
a merger or buyout was a recognition that the company was for
"sale."' 75 As a result, the court reasoned that "[t]he duty of the board
had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate en-
tity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stock-
holders' benefit." 76 In other words, the "directors' role changed from
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting
the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company. '77 By
entering into the agreement with Fortsman, largely out of concern for
supporting the value of the notes, the board breached its duty to the
shareholders to maximize share value, as the agreement with
Fortsman effectively foreclosed further bidding.7"
70. The "no shop" provision was a promise by Revlon to deal exclusively with
Fortsman in the face of a takeover. Id. at 175.
71. There would be a $25 million cancellation fee payable to Fortsman by Revlon
if the agreement terminated or if another acquiror obtained more than 19.9% of Rev-
lon's stock. Id at 178.
72. l at 178-79.
73. I& at 179. By this point, Pantry Pride already had sought injunctive relief
from the note purchase rights plan. Id. In light of these developments with Fortsman,
Pantry Pride amended its complaint, challenging the lock-up, the cancellation fee, and
the exercise of the rights and the notes covenants. Id. Pantry Pride also sought a
temporary restraining order preventing Revlon from putting any assets in escrow or
transferring them to Fortsman. IA
The Court of Chancery granted the relief Pantry Pride sought. See MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d. 1239, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985). The court
concluded that Revlon's directors had breached their duty of loyalty by making such
concessions to Fortsman out of concern for the noteholders, rather than maximizing
the sale price of the company for the stockholders' benefit. Id. at 1249-50.
74. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 ("[W]hen Pantry Pride increased its offer to $50
per share, and then to $53, it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company
was inevitable."). The court did not specify why the "break-up" was inevitable, but
presumably it was because the bidding had reached such heights that the only way to
service the debt taken on to purchase Revlon would be to break up and sell parts of
the company. Indeed, part of Fortsman's plan was to sell Revlon's Norcliff Thayer
and Reheis divisions to American Home Products for $335 million. Id. at 178. Before
the merger, Revlon planned to sell its cosmetics and fragrance division to Adler &
Shaykin for $905 million. Id. These transactions were to facilitate the purchase of
Revlon by Fortsman or any other acquiror. Id.
75. Id at 182.
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Id The court placed particular emphasis on the Board's concern for the sag-
ging value of the notes and the Board's belief that the Fortsman proposal would shore
up the value of the notes. See id. The court stated that "the Revlon board could not
make the requisite showing of good faith by preferring the noteholders and ignoring
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For some time after the Revlon decision, it widely was thought that
the case created specific duties that required a board to auction the
company off to the highest bidder."9 The language of the Revlon opin-
ion, in which the court emphasized the board's duty to act as "auction-
eers," "get[ ] the best price for the stockholders" and "sell[ ] the
company to the highest bidder,"' 0 appears to support such an inter-
pretation. Nevertheless, when analyzing the opinion in its entirety, it
becomes clear that the "auction" language in Revlon does not confer
an affirmative duty to auction off the company. In Revlon, an intense
auction was already in progress.8 By entering into the agreement
with Fortsman, out of a misplaced concern for the noteholders, Rev-
Ion's board ended the auction with "no rationally related benefit
thereby accru[ing] to the stockholders."' s Accordingly, the court
found that Revlon's board breached its obligation to the shareholders
because ending the auction operated to the shareholder's detriment. 83
Therefore, the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently has found Rev-
lon to stand for the notion that "when several suitors are actively bid-
ding for control of a corporation, the directors may not use defensive
tactics that destroy the auction process" by impermissibly favoring
one bidder over another."
Since Revlon, Delaware courts have expanded the application of
the principles articulated in Revlon to situations other than an auc-
tion.8s Now, in the specific situations when Revlon duties apply, a
board must ensure that the transaction into which it is entering ob-
tains the best value reasonably available for shareholders.86 In deter-
its duty of loyalty to the shareholders," as the rights of the noteholders were already
fixed by contract. Id. Thus, when Revlon's board entered into an "auction-ending
lock-up" with Fortsman, on the basis of this misplaced concern for the noteholders at
the expense of the shareholders, the board breached its primary duty of loyalty. Id.
The court stated that "such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate
when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to
protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder." Id.
79. See, e.g., Paul E. Burns, Tuning is Paramount: The Impact of Paramount v.
Tune on the Law of Hostile Takeovers, 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 761,770 (1991) (describ-
ing Revlon as imposing a duty to auction when invoked); Nfirvis, supra note 36, at 5-6
("Revlon is the 'radically altered state' in which directors come under a categorical
imperative to maximize immediate, short-term stockholder value."); Barry Reder,
The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to Act as an Auctioneer, 44
Bus. Law 275 (1989) (describing throughout a director's obligation to act as an auc-
tioneer under Revlon); Rinaldi, supra note 36, at 762 ("Once in the 'Revlon zone,' a
director's obligation to the corporation's shareholders is narrow and specific achieve
immediate maximization of share value.").
80. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-84.
81. See id. at 178-85.
82. Id. at 183.
83. Id. 182-83.
84. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
85. See infra text accompanying note 279.
86. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44
(Del. 1993).
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mining "best value," a board must be informed fully.87 Further, while
a board may become informed by using various methods, such as an
auction or canvass of the market,' neither method is required.89 A
board also may consider various factors other than the dollar amount
of a bid.90 Indeed, there is "'no single blueprint'" for fulfilling Rev-
Ion duties.91 Thus, in the mid-1990s, Revlon duties do not require an
auction, but rather require that a board is informed fully when enter-
ing into a transaction in which it is required to obtain the best value
reasonably available for shareholders./
B. Triggering Revlon-The Early Cases and Their Teachings
In Revlon, presumably because an auction was in progress, the
court characterized the situation as a "sale" of the company that was
"inevitable." 93 The court, however, did not articulate what would
constitute a "sale" in other contexts, thus leaving ambiguous the pre-
cise events that trigger Revlon.94 The evolution of Revlon's progeny
illustrates some circumstances in which Revlon duties apply. Indeed,
the Delaware Supreme Court, interpreting these cases, recently enun-
ciated a distinct set of criteria for when this obligation to obtain the
best value reasonably available for shareholders occurs.95 The duty
does not apply to all takeovers. Rather, it applies during the "break-
up" of a company or when the board facilitates a "sale" or "change in
control" of a corporation.96 Boards of directors thus may attempt to
87. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989). For factors to
consider in determining the value of a company, see infra note 245.
88. See id at 1286-87. If an auction that will result in a change in control is in-
volved, however, in encouraging the best value for shareholders, directors must "act
in a neutral manner" and may not play favorites with contending bidders. Id. at 1286.
89. See id. at 1286. Revlon, however, is still misinterpreted as requiring an auc-
tion. See Phillip J. Azzollini, The Wake of Paramount v. QVC: Can a Majority Share-
holder Avoid Triggering the Auction Duty During a Merger And Retain A Significant
Equity Interest? Suggestion: A Pooling of Interests, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 573, 581
(1994) ("The Revlon duty requires that a board, upon recognition that the corporation
is for sale, must maximize the company's value at an auction for the stockholders'
benefit."). Indeed, perhaps it is this continued association of an auction with the
phrase Revlon duties that is an element of the Delaware Supreme Court's dislike of
that phrase in Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del.
1994).
90. See infra note 245.
91. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,44 (Del.
1993) (quoting Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286).
92. See id.
93. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
94. See Rinaldi, supra note 36, at 763 (noting that perhaps because the court "first
applied the duty to [Revlon,] a case involving an unambiguous transaction ... the
Revlon court overlooked the need to explain what would qualify as a 'sale' in less
clear-cut circumstances").
95. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994).
96. Id at 1290.
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avoid the obligations set forth in Revlon and its progeny by structuring
transactions or responding to hostile bids in ways in which the Dela-
ware courts have deemed not to result in a "sale," "change in con-
trol," or "break up." Furthermore, the opinions in post-Revlon cases
illustrate some of the concerns behind Revlon duties. The lessons
learned from the following cases, therefore, are valuable for boards
considering transactions that may implicate Revlon.
1. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.
In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,97 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a board's actions, facilitating the emergence
of a 49.7% shareholder, did not constitute a Revlon-triggering change
in control because of an agreement limiting that shareholder's board
representation to 40% for a ten-year period.98 In that case, Ivanhoe
Partners and Ivanhoe Acquisition Corp. mounted an unsolicited bid
for Newmont Mining Corp. 9 Newmont's board responded to the
threat by implementing a restructuring plan.3° ° The plan included a
special dividend that facilitated Newmont's largest shareholder, Con-
solidated Gold Fields PLC, to increase its stake in Newmont from
26% to 49.7%. 101 Newmont and Gold Fields also entered into a ten-
year "standstill agreement," which limited Gold Fields to a maximum
of 49.9% of Newmont's stock and 40% representation on Newmont's
board."° It further provided that Gold Fields could not transfer its
interest to a third party unless that third party agreed to be bound by
the standstill agreement." 3
The Delaware Supreme Court, focusing on the board's desire to
keep the company independent through the standstill agreement, held
that the board's response was reasonable in relation to the threat
posed and that the transaction did not constitute an inevitable sale of
the company within the meaning of Revlon.' 4 No change of control
97. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
98. Id. at 1345.
99. Id at 1336-37.
100. Id
101. Id at 1337.
102. Id. at 1340.
103. Id
104. Id at 1345. The court stated:
First, Newmont was never for sale.... [Tihe Newmont board held fast to
its decision to keep the company independent. Ultimately, this goal was
achieved by the standstill agreement and related defensive measures.
Second, there was neither a bidding contest, nor a sale. The only bidder
for Newmont was Ivanhoe. Gold Fields was not a bidder, but wished only to
protect its already substantial interest in the company. It did so through the
street sweep. Thus, the Newmont board did not "sell" the company to Gold
Fields. The latter's purchases were from private sellers. While Gold Fields
now owns 49.7% of the stock, its representation on the board is only 40%
because of the restrictions of the standstill agreement. These facts do not
strip the Newmont board of the presumptions of independence and good
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occurred because the remaining shareholders still controlled the cor-
poration, as the standstill agreement retained in them the power to
elect sixty percent of the company's board." 5 The Delaware Supreme
Court since has recognized Newmont as an example of how such a
corporate restructuring can take place in the face of coercive offers
without invoking Revlon.10 6 More specifically, the Delaware Supreme
Court has cited Newmont as an example of a means to protect minor-
ity interests in a potential change-of-control situation.'0 7 Protecting
the minority's interests is important because when control of a corpo-
ration is acquired, the remaining minority stockholders lose any con-
trol of the corporation they may have had and are entitled to
compensation for their loss.' This compensation generally comes in
the form of a control premium. 10 9 Thus, absent structural devices pro-
tecting minority stockholders in a change of control, the directors
have the obligation to obtain the best value reasonably available for
the stockholders' shares. 10 In Newmont, because the protective de-
vices caused the powers of majority ownership to remain dormant,
control, in effect, was not sold. Accordingly, Newmont illustrates that
protective devices may be employed to curtail the voting power of a
transactionally-resultant controlling shareholder and thus prevent the
type of change in control likely to trigger Revlon.'
2. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc. 112 helps to clarify what constitutes a change of control
for Revlon purposes and also contributes to understanding a board's
fiduciary duties under Revlon. While the court's opinion in Macmillan
specifically decides whether to enjoin a lock-up agreement with a
faith under the business judgment rule. Even though Newmont's declaration
of the dividend facilitated the street sweep, it did not constitute a "sale" of
the company by Newmont.
Id. (citations omitted).
105. See id.
106. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del.
1988) ("In [Newmont] we recognized that a change in corporate structure under the
special facts and circumstances of that case did not invoke Revlon.").
107. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42
n.12 (Del. 1993) ("Examples of such protective provisions Ifor minority shareholders]
are supermajority voting provisions, majority of the minority requirements, etc .....
[W]e note that this Court has upheld, under different circumstances, the reasonable-
ness of a standstill agreement which limited a 49.9 percent stockholder to 40 percent
board representation." (citations omitted)).
108. Id. at 43.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Preserving a Friendly Merger: Top M&A Lawyers Debate how the Para-
mount Battle will Affect Future Mergers, American Law. Corp. Couns. Mag., Summer
1994, at 86, 87. For further discussion on employing structural devices, see infra part
Ill.B.
112. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
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leveraged buyout firm, it is that court's characterizations of Revlon
duties regarding other specific facts described earlier in the Macmillan
opinion1 3 that are most helpful.
In Macmillan, Macmillan's board, recognizing that the company
was a likely takeover candidate, adopted various defensive measures
that included a restructuring plan with anti-takeover features. 114 The
plan involved a complex restructuring of the company, dividing the
company into two parts: the information business and the publishing
business." 5 Soon after the board's approval of this restructuring, a
hostile bid emerged from the Robert M. Bass Group, Inc.' 6 In re-
sponse, Macmillan's board amended various aspects of the restructur-
ing plan and its anti-takeover mechanisms." 7 Under the amended
restructuring plan, management would own thirty-nine percent of the
more valuable part, the information business, while a management-
controlled employee stock option plan would own twenty-six percent
of the publishing business." 8 The court stated that the net effect of
the plan would increase management's then combined holdings of
4.5% in Macmillan to 39% in the information business alone.'1 9 A
special committee of the board adopted the plan and rejected the Bass
offer.'20 After further deliberations that failed to result in an agree-
ment, Bass brought suit.' 2'
In looking at these facts, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that
"[t]his case does not require a judicial determination of when Macmil-
113. Id- at 1264. The facts of the case described in this Note have come to be
known as Macmillan L See id. at 1272. Macmillan II involved the enjoining of a lock-
up agreement between Macmillan and Kholberg Kravis Roberts & Co., a firm special-
izing in leveraged buyouts. See id. at 1264. Although the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision here relates to Macmillan II, it is the court's characterizations of the transac-
tion in Macmillan I that are most helpful for the purposes of this Note. This Note
therefore will refer to the case only as Macmillan and will not be concerned with
those facts which have been termed Macmillan I.
114. Id. at 1266.
115. Id. The reason for the two-company concept was to increase management's
control over the entities, thus making a takeover more difficult. Id.
116. Id
117. Id at 1267-71.
118. Id at 1270. In exchange for their Macmillan shares, the public stockholders
would receive a dividend of $52.35, a $4.50 debenture, a "stub share" of the publish-
ing business ($5.10) and a one-half share of the information business (S2.20). Id The
management group and the ESOP would exchange their restricted stock and options
for restricted shares of the information business, representing a 39.2% stake in that
company. Id The ESOP would own 26% of the publishing business. Id.
119. Id
120. Id at 1271.
121. Id at 1271-72. On July 14, 1988, the Court of Chancery preliminary enjoined
the restructuring and held that the Bass offers were clearly superior to the restructur-
ing plan. Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1243-47 (Del. Ch.
1988). The Chancery Court implied that any threat posed was being used merely as a
pretext for management to avail themselves of any takeover threat and to increase
their own and their employees' stake in the company. See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at
1271 n.16. The Chancery Court's holding essentially ended Macmillan L Id at 1272.
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Ian was 'for sale'" but rather that the transaction could be character-
ized as a "sale" for Revlon purposes "[b]y any standards."'" More
importantly, the court made clear that Revlon would apply in such a
situation, whether the " 'sale' takes the form of an active auction, a
management buyout, or a 'restructuring.' "123
Three important lessons are learned from Macmillan. First, the
court's characterization of the transfer of thirty-nine percent as a "sale
of control" acknowledges that the transfer of effective control will suf-
fice to trigger Revlon and that the transfer of a majority of stock is not
required.124 Not requiring majority ownership to trigger Revlon
makes sense because majority equity control is not required to control
the board of a widely held public corporation.12
Second, the Macmillan court's broad description of what a "sale"
includes for Revlon purposes (i.e., an active auction, a management
buyout, or a restructuring) indicates that any transaction that results
in a transfer of corporate control will be governed by Revlon, regard-
less of how the transaction is structured. Thus, boards must be wary
of any transfer, regardless of the form, that changes the effective con-
trol of a corporation. Moreover, in a widely held public corporation,
it seems that a transfer of near thirty-nine percent of a company's
shares, as in the Macmillan transaction, may suffice for control.
Third, the court clarified some aspects of the fiduciary duties enun-
ciated in Revlon. Specifically, the court noted that a board can con-
122. 1& at 1285. The court continued: "By any standards this company was for sale
both in Macmillan I and 1H." ld.
123. Id.
124. See id. One might argue that this finding is a departure from Ivanhoe Partners
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). See Portia Policastro, Note,
When Delaware Corporate Managers Turn Auctioneers: Triggering the Revlon Duty
After the Paramount Decision, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 187, 189 (1991) (arguing that, under
Newmont, a change of control for Revlon purposes occurs only when a majority vot-
ing block of a company's stock is sold). In Newmont, the board facilitated a share-
holder's acquisition of 49.9% of the company's stock, and the court found no change
in control. Newmont, 535 A.2d at 1345. Thus, one might think Newmont requires
majority ownership for control. Nonetheless, in that case the 49.9% shareholder en-
tered into an agreement with the Newmont's board, whereby that shareholder was
limited to 40% board representation. Id. There was no change in control because the
other shareholders retained control over 60% of the board and thus control of the
corporation. Id. Accordingly, it is inaccurate to argue that effective control does not
constitute control under Newmont because, in Newmont, the 49.9% shareholder did
not have effective control as the other shareholders retained control of the
corporation.
125. In widely held public corporations, where ownership is fragmented over myr-
iad shareholders, a shareholder with a large block of stock that is less than 50% often
has de facto control, because that person is usually in the best position to mobilize
sufficient votes to elect a majority of the board. See Solomon et al., supra note 3, at
1138; see also Rinaldi, supra note 36, at 775-81 (noting that in widely held public
corporations, ownership of around 35% gives control depending on the circum-
stances, and arguing that Revlon should only be triggered where there has been a
change in the control structure of a corporation).
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sider factors other than price;"2 thus, the highest dollar amount does
not necessarily control. Those considerations include, among other
things, the reputation of the bidder, the financing involved, the bid-
der's plans for the corporation, and the effects on the stockholders."z
The court also explained the level of judicial scrutiny a court applies
when imposing Revlon duties upon directors. Namely, the court "will
continue to exact an enhanced judicial scrutiny at the threshold, as in
Unocal, before the normal presumptions of the business judgment
rule will apply."' 28
3. Barkan v. Amsted Industries
In Barkan v. Amsted Industries,'29 the Delaware Supreme Court ex-
plained that Revlon applies whenever there is a change in control of a
corporation and also emphasized that, in fulfilling its obligations
under Revlon, a board must be informed fully to ensure that the stock-
holders receive the best value for their shares. 30 In Barkan, Amsted's
board, following the accumulation of a large block of shares by a re-
puted "greenmailer,"'131 implemented a "poison pill"'13 and created a
special committee of independent directors to consider a possible
management-sponsored leveraged buyout and an employee stock
126. Macmillan attempts to clarify the duties of directors once Revlon has been
triggered. The court notes that once within Revlon, "discriminatory treatment of a
bidder, without any rational benefit to the shareholders, [is] unwarranted" and that a
board's proper objective within Revlon is "to obtain the highest price reasonably
available for the company, provided it was offered by a reputable and responsible
bidder." Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1282. Thus, the court provided some helpful exam-
pies of what a board might look to in evaluating a bid*
In assessing the bid and the bidder's responsibility, a board may consider,
among various proper factors, the adequacy and terms of the offer, its fair-
ness and feasibility;, the proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the
consequences of that financing; questions of illegality, the impact of both the
bid and the potential acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it
bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests; the risk
of nonconsumation; the basic stockholder interests at stake; the bidder's
identity, prior background and other business venture experiences; and the
bidder's business plans for the corporation and their effects on stockholder
interests.
Id at 1282 n.29.
127. Id
128. Id at 1288.
129. 567 A.2d 1279 (DeL 1989).
130. Id. at 1286-87.
131. For a definition of "greenmail," see supra note 48.
132. Poison pills are shareholder rights plans that typically grant to stockholders a
contingent right to purchase stock or other securities on the occurrence of a specific
triggering event. See Solomon et al., supra note 3, at 1205-06. Until the triggering
event occurs, the board retains the right to redeem the rights for a nominal payment.
Id. Thus, the board's power to redeem the rights provides incentive to bidders to
negotiate with a target board before making a tender offer. Id. In Barkan, the rights
plan would be triggered if anyone acquired 20% of Amsted's shares or announced an
offer enabling them to acquire 30% and would allow holders of such rights to
purchase newly issued Amsted stock. See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1282.
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ownership plan.'33 The special committee sought the opinion of an
investment bank, which opined that the value of the board-sponsored
transaction was "high in the range of fairness."'" The special com-
mittee then recommended the transaction to the full board of direc-
tors, which approved the transaction. 135
A group of stockholders who claimed that the board breached its
fiduciary duties by entering into the transaction settled their claim
with the Chancery Court's approval. 36 Barkan, a shareholder, chal-
lenged the settlement. 37 Barkan claimed that because control would
change, the directors violated their Revlon duties by not canvassing
the market to seek an alternative that would bring the highest value
before approving the management buyout.138
The court rejected Barkan's claim, holding that the board had ful-
filled any duties it may have had under Revlon. 39 It noted that the
board had adequate information to evaluate the fairness of the trans-
action. 4 ' Additionally, the court held that the board was not required
to conduct an active survey of the market and found that it had valid
reasons for believing that no rival bidder would be able to surpass the
price offered by the management-sponsored buyout group.' 4' There-
fore, the court concluded that a board need not conduct an auction in
fulfilling its Revlon duties, but only must ensure that it is obtaining the
best value for the shareholders. 42 In Barkan, because the board had
133. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1281-82.
134. Ia at 1283.
135. IA
136. Id. at 1282.
137. Id.
138. Id at 1285.
139. Id at 1286-87.
140. Id at 1286.
141. Id In discussing a board's duties under Revlon, the court stated:
[I]n Revlon we held that when several suitors are actively bidding for control
of a corporation, the directors may not use defensive tactics that destroy the
auction process. When it becomes clear that the auction will result in a
change of corporate control, the board must act in a neutral manner to en-
courage the highest possible price for shareholders. However, Revlon does
not demand that every change in the control of a Delaware corporation be
preceded by a heated bidding contest. Revlon is merely one of an unbroken
line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the
field of mergers and acquisitions by demanding that directors act with
scrupulous concern for fairness to shareholders. When multiple bidders are
competing for control, this concern for fairness forbids directors from using
defensive mechanisms to thwart an auction or to favor one bidder over an-
other. When the board is considering a single offer and has no reliable
grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness demands
a canvas of the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited. When,
however, the directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which to
evaluate the fairness of a transaction, they may approve that transaction
without conducting an active survey of the market.
Id. at 1286-87 (citations omitted).
142. Id at 1286.
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adequate information on which to base such a determination, it was
not required to seek alternative transactions. 43
Barkan further clarified when Revlon applies. The court stated that
"the general principles announced in. Revlon... govern this case and
every case in which a fundamental change of corporate control occurs
or is contemplated.""' Thus, while Revlon concerned the inevitable
break-up of a company, 4 ' Barkan explicitly dictates that Revlon du-
ties also are triggered by a change in control."* Although Barkan is
helpful in stating the significance of a "change in control," the case
does not assist in defining a "change in control."
C. Approaching the 1990s: Time-Warner and its "Break-Up" Tests
In Paramount Communications, Ina v. Time Inc., commonly re-
ferred to as "Time-Warner,"'47 the Delaware Supreme Court found
that Revlon did not apply to a transaction that resulted in Warner
shareholders owning sixty-two percent of the merged entity."" Un-
like Barkan, which indicated that a "change in control" triggers Rev-
Ion,'4 9 the court in Time-Warner apparently concluded that only
certain scenarios involving the "break-up" of a company trigger Rev-
lon.' 50 As a result, Time-Warner cast some confusion on the appropri-
ate test for when Revlon applies."5 '
1. Tune-Warner
In 1987, Time, hoping to move into the area of video programming,
established a special committee to evaluate possible expansion strate-
gies for the 1990s.' 2 The primary concern of Time's outside directors
was the preservation of "Tune culture," with emphasis on Time's tra-
dition of journalistic integrity. 5 3 With these considerations in mind,
Time's board considered various potential merger candidates and con-
143. Id at 1287.
144. Id at 1286 (emphasis added).
145. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
146. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286.
147. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). This case has come to be called Tune-Warner, re-
ferring to the transaction between Time and Warner in that case. See Cunningham
and Yablon, supra note 21, at 1595 n.14.
148. Tune-Warner, 571 A. 2d at 1149-50.
149. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
150. See infra note 174.
151. See In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 11495,
1992 WL 212595, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) (concluding that T-une-Warner and
Barkan are "not easily reconcil[able]").
152. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Del
1989).
153. Id at 1143 n.4.
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cluded that Warner Communications was the superior candidate for a
consolidation.15 4
After a series of negotiations, the two companies agreed upon a
stock-for-stock deal with an exchange rate favoring Warner of .465.111
The merged entity, Time-Warner, would have a twenty-four member
board, with twelve members representing each corporation.15 6 The
company would begin with co-CEOs, one from Tune and one from
Warner. 57 Eventually, after the Warner CEO's retirement, the Time
CEO would remain the sole CEO of Time-Warner. 158
About three months later, two weeks before the requisite share-
holder vote on the merger, Paramount Communications, Inc. an-
nounced an all-cash offer to purchase Tune for $175 per share.159
After considering Paramount's offer and then rejecting it, Tine's
board, with Warner's approval, recast the consolidation into an out-
right acquisition of Warner by Time. 16 0 Paramount then raised its bid
to $200 per share.' 6' Once again, Time's board rejected Paramount's
bid, maintaining that "the Warner transaction offered a greater long-
term value for the stockholders and, unlike Paramount's offer, did not
pose a threat to Time's survival and its 'culture.' 1,62
Subsequently, Paramount, and some of Tune's shareholders,
brought suit and forwarded, among other things, a Revlon claim. 63
The plaintiffs contended that the Tine-Warner agreement, which
would result in Warner shareholders owning sixty-two percent of the
combined company, effectively put Tune up for sale and triggered the
board's Revlon duties to sell the company to the highest bidder."6
The Chancery Court rejected the Revlon claim, finding that the Time-
Warner agreement did not constitute a "change in control" because
"control of the corporation existed in a fluid aggregation of unaffili-
ated shareholders" and, therefore, did not trigger Revlon.165 Further,
154. Id. at 1145.
155. Id. at 1146. On the basis of a .465 exchange rate, Warner stockholders would
own approximately 62% of the common stock of the merged entity Time-Warner. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id-
159. Id. at 1147.
160. Id at 1148.
161. Id at 1149.
162. Id
163. Id at 1149. Plaintiffs also forwarded a Unocal claim, which the court rejected
on the basis that the board's actions satisfied Unocal's two-pronged test. Id. at 1153-
55.
164. Id at 1149.
165. Id at 1150. Chancellor Allen stated:
If the appropriate inquiry is whether a change in control is contemplated,
the answer must be sought in the specific circumstances surrounding the
transaction. Surely under some circumstances a stock for stock merger
could reflect a transfer of corporate control. That would, for example,
plainly be the case here if Warner were a private company. But where, as
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the transaction did not preclude Time's shareholders from receiving a
control premium for their shares, because they retained the possibility
of receiving such a premium for their shares if the merged entity was
later sold.' 6
While the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly upheld the Chancery
Court's legal and factual conclusions, 67 it nevertheless premised its
rejection of the Revlon claim on different grounds. The court declared
that, without excluding other possibilities, two circumstances may im-
plicate Revlon:' (1) "when a corporation initiates an active bidding
process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization in-
volving a clear break-up of the company"; 169 and (2) where "in re-
sponse to a bidder's offer, a target [board] abandons its long-term
strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the breakup of
the company."'170 As no such break-up was apparent in i7me-Warner,
the court found that Revlon did not apply. 7' Furthermore, while
cases such as Barkan v. Amsted Industries"2 broadened the scope of
Revlon duties by including situations such as changes in control, the
Time-Warner court apparently narrowed the scope with its "break-up"
tests.'7 3 Indeed, to some, Time- Warner's break-up tests represented
the only means of triggering Revlon. 74
here, the shares of both constituent corporations are widely held, corporate
control can be expected to remain unaffected by a stock for stock merger...
[as] [clontrol of both [companies] remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,279-80 (DeL Ch.), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (DeL 1989). This
notion of keeping control widely held by public shareholders is especially important
in that it increases the options of corporate planners. In other words, any transaction
may take place, without triggering Revlon, provided that control of the corporation
after the transaction remains vested in a widely dispersed public and providing that
there is no break-up involved. See infra part HI.C.
166. Tune-Warner, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) '1 94,514, at
93,280.
167. Tune-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150 ("The Chancellor's findings of fact are sup-
ported by the record and his conclusion is correct as a matter of law.").
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1150-51.
172. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
173. See In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 11495,
1992 WL 212595, at *7 (DeL Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) ("The premise of [Time-Warner] ap-
pears more narrow.").
174. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lockups
in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 239,312 (1990) ("[Q1nly those
negotiated acquisitions that contemplate breaking-up the target will trigger Revlon.");
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L Rev. 1931, 1944
n.45 (1991) ("Revlon applies only if the board actively initiates a bidding process for
the firm or, as in Revlon itself, goes about breaking up the firm in response to a
hostile bid."); Policastro, supra note 124, at 237 (concluding that Tune-Warner holds
that, aside from the isolated case where a board initiates a bidding process to sell the
corporation, "the Revlon duty will trigger only when a board of directors either initi-
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Time-Warner is important for corporate planners structuring a
merger. At the very least, it represents a merger transaction, the
structure of which was approved by the Delaware Supreme Court,
that did not trigger Revlon. Specifically, Time-Warner effectively ap-
proves mergers between widely held companies and notes that absent
one of the two "break-up" scenarios, Revlon is not triggered. After
Time-Warner, a change in control will not occur if control remains
vested in a widely dispersed public. 75 Furthermore, the Time-Warner
decision remains helpful as it has not only been upheld, but the Dela-
ware Supreme Court explicitly has incorporated its "break-up" scena-
rios into the Revlon analysis.' 76
2. In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholders Litigation
While Time-Warner still may have didactic value to corporate plan-
ners, courts nonetheless entered the 1990s unsure of the correct Rev-
lon test.177 Barkan suggested a "change in control test," while Time-
Warner suggested its "break-up" tests.178 Before the court in QVC
first reconciled the two cases,'17 early 1990s' caselaw exhibited admit-
ted uncertainty. Indeed, in In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc.
Shareholders Litigation,80 the court explicitly asserted that the courts'
conclusions in Time-Warner and Barkan are not easily reconcilable.18'
In Wheelabrator, the Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. board ap-
proved a merger with Waste Management, Inc. that would result in
Waste becoming a fifty-five percent stockholder of Wheelabrator.'1
The structure of the acquisition was a stock-for-stock merger of a
ates a transaction or responds to an offer in such a way as to cause a break up or
dissolution of its corporation"). Indeed, Paramount Communications, Inc., in litiga-
tion with QVC Network, Inc., recently relied on the purported absence of a "break-
up" to argue that Revlon was not triggered. See Paramount Communications Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1993) ("The Paramount defendants and
Viacom assert that.. .enhanced judicial scrutiny... [is] not implicated in this case in
the absence of a 'break-up' of the corporation."). Paramount made the fatal mistake,
however, of ignoring the phrase "without excluding other possibilities" that the Time-
Warner court used before listing its "break-up" tests. Id. at 47. Consequently, as the
Delaware Supreme Court in QVC clarified, the situations that trigger Revlon are not
as narrow after Time-Warner as they may have seemed, because other non-break-up
situations also trigger Revlon. Id at 47.
175. This conclusion stems from the court's broad approval of the Chancery Court
opinion, which made such a finding. See supra note 167. Furthermore, the Delaware
Supreme Court has cited Tune-Warner in upholding such a proposition. See QVC, 637
A.2d at 47; Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994).
176. See Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1289-90.
177. See In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 11495,
1992 WL 212595, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992).
178. kd
179. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46
(Del. 1993).
180. C.A. No. 11495, 1992 WL 212595, at *7-9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992).
181. Id. at *7.
182. Id. at *1.
2292 [Vol. 63
STRUCTURING A MERGER
Waste subsidiary into Wheelabrator, resulting in the Wheelabrator
shareholders realizing a ten percent premium over the market value
of their shares given up in the merger.'83 Although a majority of
Wheelabrator's shareholders approved the merger, several other
Wheelabrator shareholders brought suit, alleging, among other things,
that the board breached their Revlon duties to maximize shareholder
value in the merger transaction."8
The defendants argued that Time-Warner controlled and, therefore,
Revlon duties did not apply.'85 The plaintiffs argued that Barkan con-
trolled and that the board's Revlon duties applied and were vio-
lated.18 In assessing these arguments, the court stated that, under
Barkan, a board becomes subject to Revlon duties whenever 'a fun-
damental change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated.' ",
The court went on to state that the premise of Time-Warner appears
more narrow because in that case, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that Revlon duties arise when "'the dissolution or break-up of
the corporate entity [is] inevitable.' "18 The court concluded that a
fundamental change of corporate control need not involve the dissolu-
tion or break-up of a company. 89 Thus, the court concluded, because
Barkan appears not to fit within Time-Warner's categories, it would be
difficult to conclude that Barkan's formulation was intended as one of
Time-Warner's "'other possibilities.' "90
Unfortunately, after setting up this doctrinal conflict, the court de-
clined to resolve this issue, noting that the facts of the case did not
require this determination.' 9' In Paramount Communications Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc,'92 however, the Delaware Supreme Court revis-
ited the question of when a court will impose Revlon duties upon a
board.
I. THE IMPACT OF Q VC ON TRIGGERING REVLON DUTiS
In the early 1990s, as the Chancery Court's opinion in Wheelabrator
illustrates, some ambiguity remained as to whether a "break-up" or a
"change in control" triggered the duties enunciated in Revlon. Para-
mount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.'9' clarified that
183. Id.
184. Id. at *1-2.
185. Id. at *7.
186. Id.
187. Id (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)).
188. Id. (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1150 (Del. 1989)).
189. Id. at *8.
190. Id (quoting 7tune-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150).
191. Id
192. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
193. Id
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both tests are relevant for Revlon purposes. 94 QVC also contributed
to an understanding of the change-in-control standard. For example,
in Time-Warner, the court acknowledged that a change in control
should not trigger Revlon if control of the corporation remains widely
held.'95 This assertion, however, was not explicit in the Delaware
Supreme Court's opinion in Time-Warner, but derived from that
court's broad approval of the Chancery Court's opinion in that
case.'9 6 The Delaware Supreme Court in QVC clarifies the issue, spe-
cifically noting that a change in control would not have occurred in
QVC if control of the post-merger entity remained widely held by an
unaffiliated group of public shareholders.'97 Moreover, since QVC,
the Delaware Supreme Court in Arnold v. Society for Savings
Bancorp'98 applied and clarified QVC's Revlon analysis. What
amount of ownership is necessary for control, however, remains am-
biguous. Nonetheless, if a shareholder is in a position to acquire con-
trol, QVC supports the type of protective devices used in Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.199 to avoid a change in control for
Revlon purposes.20°
A. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.
In early July 1993, Paramount Inc. and Viacom, Inc. began serious
negotiations for a possible combination. 0' Paramount was a widely
held public corporation.2 °2 Viacom, however, was controlled by its
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Sumner Redstone, who owned
approximately 85.2% of Viacom's Class A voting stock.2"3 On Sep-
tember 12, 1993, the Paramount board approved a merger agreement
whereby Paramount would merge with and into Viacom. 0 4 Para-
mount also agreed to amend its "poison pill" to exempt the proposed
merger with Viacom.2 0 5 The merger agreement contained several de-
fensive measures designed to discourage competing bids, including a
194. Id at 48. In making this conclusion, the court refrains from using the term
"Revlon duties." Rather, the court states that the obligation to obtain the best value
reasonably available for shareholders arises when there is either a break-up or change
in control.
195. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 167.
197. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 46.
198. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
199. 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987).
200. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42 n.12.
201. Id at 38.
202. Id at 37.
203. Id at 38. Sumner Redstone owned this 85.2% indirectly. Further, Redstone
also owned 69.2% of Viacom's nonvoting Class B stock through an entity owned
91.7% by him. Id.
204. Id at 39. The terms provided that "each share of Paramount common stock
would be converted into 0.10 shares of Viacom Class A voting stock, 0.90 shares of
Viacom class B nonvoting stock, and $9.10 in cash." Id.
205. Id
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"no-shop" provision,206 a termination fee, 207 and a stock option
agreement.2° s
The parties announced the merger on September 12, 1993.209 On
September 20, 1993, QVC Network Inc. proposed to Paramount a
transaction whereby QVC would acquire Paramount.21 0 Shortly
thereafter, QVC announced an eighty dollar per share cash tender of-
fer for fifty-one percent of Paramount's shares, to be followed by a
second-step merger for Paramount's remaining shares.
11 QVC condi-
tioned its offer upon the invalidation of the stock option agreement.
212
In response to QVC's bid, Viacom and Paramount amended their
original merger agreement, and Viacom announced an eighty dollar
per share cash tender offer for fifty-one percent of Paramount's
shares, with the remainder in securities.213 Soon after, Viacom unilat-
erally raised its offer to eighty-five dollars per share, with a compara-
ble increase in the securities.214 Viacom's proposed transaction would
have resulted in Sumner Redstone owning a majority of the shares of
the merged entity.215 On November 12, 1993, QVC responded by in-
creasing its bid to ninety dollars per share and by increasing the secur-
ities by a similar amount.2 6 On November 15, 1993, the Paramount
206. Id. Under the no-shop provision, "the Paramount Board agreed that Para-
mount would not solicit, encourage, discuss, negotiate, or endorse any competing
transaction unless: (a) a third party 'makes an unsolicited written, bona fide proposal,
which is not subject to any material contingencies relating to financing'; and (b) the
Paramount Board determines that discussions or negotiations with the third party are
necessary for the Paramount Board to comply with its fiduciary duties." Id.
207. I. Under the termination fee provision, "Viacom would receive a $100 mil-
lion termination fee if: (a) Paramount terminated the Original Merger Agreement
because of a competing transaction; (b) Paramount's stockholders did not approve
the merger, or (c) the Paramount Board recommended a competing transaction." Id.
208. Id The court described the stock option agreement as "the most significant
deterrent device." Id It "granted to Viacom an option to purchase approximately
19.9 percent (23,699,000) shares of Paramount's outstanding common stock at $69.14
per share if any of the triggering events for the Termination Fee occurred." Id. In
addition, a "Note Feature" allowed Viacom to pay for the shares with a senior
subordinated note, and thereby avoid the need to raise the $1.6 billion purchase price.
Id Further, a "Put Feature" entitled Viacom to elect to require Paramount to pay
Viacom a cash sum equal to the difference between the purchase price and the market
price of Paramount's stock. Id As this amount was not "capped," it thus could, and
eventually did, reach unreasonable levels. Id.
209. kL at 39.
210. 1d
211. Id at 40. Under the second-step merger, each remaining share of Paramount
common stock would be converted into 1.42857 shares of QVC common stock. Id
212. Id By this point, the stock option agreement was worth over $200 million, and
by November 15, 1993, it was worth nearly $500 million. Id at 40 n-5.
213. The merger consideration was such that each Paramount share would be con-
verted into 020408 shares of Viacom Class A voting stock, 1.08317 shares of Viacom
Class B nonvoting stock, and 0.20408 shares of a new series of Viacom convertible
preferred stock. Id at 40.
214. Id at 41.
215. Id at 43.
216. Id at 41.
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board met to consider this offer.217 The board determined that the
QVC offer was not in the best interests of the stockholders,purport-
edly concluding that QVC's bid was excessively conditional.21
QVC and certain stockholders of Paramount brought suit, seeking
an injunction against the Viacom tender offer and the invalidation of
Paramount's anti-takeover mechanisms.2"9 QVC argued that when
Paramount's board committed itself to a transaction that would in-
volve a change of voting control from Paramount's public stockhold-
ers to Sumner Redstone, it became subject to the duties articulated in
Revlon and its progeny.22 QVC contended that those duties required
Paramount's board to obtain the highest value immediately available
for its shareholders.2" Further, QVC argued that Paramount's board
failed to make an adequately informed decision in concluding that
Viacom's bid represented the highest available value for the com-
pany.' 2 Finally, QVC argued that the Paramount board's actions
were defensive measures that could not survive the enhanced scrutiny
mandated by Unocal.2"
Paramount responded by stating that its board had acted diligently
and was informed fully throughout.2' It further argued that the
merger with Viacom represented the fulfillment of a long-standing
business strategy, which had a greater long-term value than a combi-
nation with QVC.225 Specifically, Paramount argued that Time-
Warner, not Revlon, controlled because Paramount did not put itself
up for sale, initiate an active bidding process, or abandon a long-term
business strategy by seeking or effecting a reorganization or other
transaction involving the break-up of the company.226 Paramount fur-
ther argued that a change of control, on its own, was not sufficient to
trigger Revlon because Paramount's shareholders would experience
217. Id.
218. 1d
219. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1259
(Del. Ch.), affid, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
220. L. at 1261.
221. Id
222. Id
223. Id at 1262.
224. Id. at 1263.
225. 1d at 1263-64.
226. Idt at 1263 n.37. By contrast, QVC argued that Paramount's and Viacom's
public characterizations of the transaction, stating that Viacom would acquire Para-
mount, showed that Paramount put itself up for sale. Id. Further, at least one com-
mentator argues that these public characterizations of the transaction are significant:
"In terms of public relations, boards stand a greater chance of receiving judicial defer-
ence should they ever find themselves in court if they avoid characterizing a strategic
merger as a 'sale' of the company.... A deal's 'packaging' from day one as well as its
legal substance are both important in determining how a given business combination
will be viewed by a court." Anthony J. Dennis, Is it all in the packaging?: Mergers &
acquisitions in the wake of Paramount/QVC, Bus. L. Today, July/August 1994, at 7, 10.
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no liquidation of their interests and would have a significant continu-
ing interest in the merged entity.' 7
1. The Chancery Court Opinion
On November 24, 1993, the Court of Chancery issued its decision
granting a preliminary injunction in favor of QVC.3 The court held
that "this change of control transaction" triggered duties under Rev-
lon." 9 Moreover, it noted that a change in control entitles the owners
of control to a control premium for their shares and, generally, "to the
highest premium their controlling interest will command in the mar-
ketplace."' 0 Furthermore, the court held that the board's duty was to
seek for the shareholders "the best premium-conferring transaction
that is available in the circumstances."'' 1
The Chancery Court then explained what a board's Revlon duties
entail. Specifically, it emphasized that a board must be informed ade-
quately in evaluating the best available alternative for the corporation
and its shareholders. 32 The court noted that directors need not con-
duct an auction or a canvass of the market in every case to determine
the best value. 3 Instead, directors may approve a transaction pro-
vided they are able to demonstrate, while subject to enhanced scru-
tiny, that they based their decision on a body of reliable evidence.23
After analyzing the board's actions, however, the Court of Chancery
concluded that the board had not demonstrated that it was informed
sufficiently to have a reasoned basis for its conclusions?3 5
227. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1264
(Del. Ch.), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
228. Id at 1245, 1273.
229. Id at 1265.
230. Id at 1266.
231. Id The Chancery Court also noted that under Delaware law, "in transactions
involving a change of corporate control ... the directors must satisfy the Court of the
reasonableness of their actions before those actions will merit the protection of the
business judgment rule." Id In addition, the court noted that the fiduciary and fair-
ness concerns that underlie Revlon and its progeny exist in QVC as well and, whereas
in Tune-Warner there was no change in control, in QVC there was. Id.
232. Id at 1268.
233. Id
234. Id (citing Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989)). In such
an enhanced scrutiny context as is applicable here, "directors are not cloaked with the
normally applicable presumption that they acted with appropriate due care. The en-
hanced scrutiny required by Revlon imposes upon the directors the burden of showing
the reasonableness of their conduct." Id at 1268 n.44.
235. Id at 1268. The court also concluded that "the board cannot be permitted to
render its... antitakeover mechanisms inapplicable to the present Viacom transac-
tion, so as to permit that transaction to close and thereby preclude the shareholders
having the opportunity to consider the QVC offer." Id at 1270. The court did, how-
ever, find the termination fee provision to be reasonable. Id at 1273.
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2. The Delaware Supreme Court Opinion and Its Impact
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court deci-
sion.36 The court held that the "pending sale of control implicated in
the Paramount-Viacom transaction required the Paramount Board to
act on an informed basis to secure the best value reasonably available
to the stockholders." 7 The court noted that, before the transaction,
ownership of a majority of Paramount's voting stock was vested in a
"fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders." 238 If the transaction
were consummated, the unaffiliated public shareholders would lose
their voting power because a majority of Paramount's voting shares
would pass to a single stockholder, Sumner Redstone.239 As a result,
Redstone would have control and thus the power to break up the cor-
poration.2 40 The court then noted, presumably in response to Para-
mount's contention that the transaction with Viacom best comported
with its long term vision that "[i]rrespective of the present Paramount
Board's vision of a long-term strategic alliance with Viacom, the pro-
posed sale of control would provide the new controlling stockholder
with the power to alter that vision.""' The court explained:
In the case before us, the public stockholders (in the aggregate)
currently own a majority of Paramount's voting stock. Control of
the corporation is not vested in a single person, entity, or group, but
vested in the fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders. In the
event that the Paramount-Viacom transaction is consummated, the
public stockholders will receive cash and a minority equity voting
position in the surviving corporation. Following such consumma-
tion, there will be a controlling stockholder who will have the voting
power to: (a) elect directors; (b) cause a break-up of the corpora-
tion; (c) merge it with another company; (d) cash-out the public
stockholders; (e) amend the certificate of incorporation; (f) sell all
or substantially all of the corporate assets; or (g) otherwise alter
materially the nature of the corporation and the public stockhold-
ers' interests.z 2
Accordingly, the court found that the Paramount shareholders were
"entitled to receive, and should [have] receive[d], a control premium
236. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del.
1993).
237. Id at 37.
238. Md at 43.
239. Id.
240. Id. The court's reasoning suggests that the change in control standard is easily
derivable from the "break-up" language in Time-Warner and the language in Revlon,
which states that a board's duty to maximize shareholder value is triggered when "the
break-up of the company [is] inevitable." Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). This reasoning makes sense because, as in
QVC, when one acquires a majority of the corporation's shares that person generally
will have the power to break-up the corporation. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
241. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
242. Id. (emphasis added).
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and/or protective devices of significant value. '"2 3 Because of the ab-
sence of protective devices, the Paramount directors had an obligation
to take advantage of the current opportunity to realize for the stock-
holders "the best value reasonably available."' 2 The court specifi-
cally emphasized "the importance of the board being adequately
informed in negotiating a sale of control" and noted that, in determin-
ing the best value, a board may consider other factors besides the
amount of cash involved.24
The court then went on to distinguish ime-Warner.246 The court
rejected Paramount's argument that only a break-up triggers Rev-
lon.247 It noted that Paramount ignored lime- Warner's explicit lan-
guage stating that "other possibilities," aside from a break-up, exist to
trigger Revlon.2' Unlike ime-Warner, QVC involved a change in
control. In Time-Warner, control was vested in a fluid aggregation of
unaffiliated stockholders.24 9 The proposed Paramount-Viacom
merger would have transferred control out of the public's hands and
vested control of the merged entity with Viacom's chairman, Sumner
Redstone. 50 The court therefore concluded that when a "single per-
son or entity, or... cohesive group acting together" acquires a major-
243. l&
244. I&
245. Iat at 44. Like the Chancery Court, the Delaware Supreme Court explained
that "there is 'no single blueprint' that directors must follow" in determining the
transaction with the best value, lit (citation omitted). The court noted that methods
for determining value include "conducting an auction, canvassing the market, etc." Id.
The court provided the following guidance:
In determining which alternative provides the best value for the stockhold-
ers, a board of directors is not limited to considering only the amount of cash
involved, and is not required to ignore totally its view of the future value of a
strategic alliance. Instead, the directors should analyze the entire situation
and evaluate in a disciplined manner the consideration being offered.
Where a stock or other non-cash consideration is involved, the board should
try to quantify its value, if feasible, to achieve an objective comparison of the
alternatives.
Id. (citations omitted). The court then proceeded to state that the board may asses a
variety of practical considerations, including those listed in Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,1282 n.29 (Del. 1988). See id. For the considerations
listed in Macmillan, see supra note 126.
246. QVC, 637 A.2d at 46-48. Paramount contended that Tune-Warner and not
Revlon governed, and that under Tune-Warner, only the break-up of a company will
trigger Revlon. See id. at 46.
247. Id at 48 ("Neither Tune-Warner nor any other decision of this Court holds
that a 'break-up' of the company is essential to give rise to this obligation where there
is a sale of controL").
248. Id. at 46.
249. Id at 46.
250. Id at 43. Although the court distinguished Tune-Warner by the fact that there
was no change in control in that case, the court found that, even under Time-Warner,
Revlon would apply. Id at 46. The court stated-
[T]he instant case is clearly within the first general scenario set forth in
Tune-Warner. The Paramount Board, albeit unintentionally, had "initiate[d]
an active bidding process seeking to sell itself" by agreeing to sell control of
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ity of a corporation's voting shares, a sale of control results.251 In this
situation, the board must act reasonably to seek the transaction offer-
ing the best value reasonably available to the stockholders .1 2 This
obligation will be subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny.z 3
In addition, the court resolved the tension that courts and commen-
tators perceived over the appropriate Revlon trigger, namely, the ap-
plicability of a change-in-control test versus a break-up test.254 The
QVC court concluded that both tests were applicable. The court
stated: "[W]hen a corporation undertakes a transaction which will
cause: (a) a change in control; or (b) a break-up of the corporate en-
tity, the directors' obligation is to seek the best value reasonably avail-
able to the stockholders. '255 Moreover, while the court refrained
from frequent use of the term "Revlon duties," the court explicitly
concluded that these two distinct circumstances implicate a board's
duty to obtain the best value reasonably available for the sharehold-
ers.3 While this obligation is not the auction duty that many thought
Revlon imposed, 7 this obligation is what has come to be embodied
by the colloquialism Revlon duties.?-58
QVC thus clarifies the applicability of Revlon. The court further
noted that in a potential change-in-control situation, there is no
change in control for Revlon purposes if a board implements struc-
tural devices that restrict the power of a potential controlling share-
holder25 9 or if control of the merged entity remains widely held.2 60
Because QVC clarifies when Revlon applies and describes what a
the corporation to Viacom in circumstances where another potential ac-
quiror (QVC) was equally interested in being a bidder.
Id at 47 (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. 1989)).
251. Id at 42.
252. Id. at 43.
253. Id The Delaware Supreme Court explained:
The key features of an enhanced scrutiny test are: (a) a judicial determina-
tion regarding the adequacy of the decision making process employed by the
directors, including the information on which the directors based their deci-
sion; and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors'
action in light of the circumstances then existing. The directors have the
burden of proving that they were adequately informed and acted reasonably.
Id. at 45.
254. Some courts and commentators concluded that after Time-Warner only a
"break-up" could trigger Revlon. See supra note 174. One court even concluded that
the "break-up" test in Time-Warner and the "change in control" test, enunciated in
Barkan, "are not easily reconciled." See In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Share-
holders Litig., C.A. No. 11495, 1992 WL 212595, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992).
255. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del.
1993) (emphasis omitted).
256. See id.
257. See supra note 79.
258. See supra note 12.
259. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 42-43, 42 n.12.
260. See id. at 46-47.
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board may do to avoid a change in control, the threat of implicating
the specific duties imposed in Revlon is lessened. 261
B. Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp
In Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp,26 the first case involving
Revlon duties decided after QVC, both the Court of Chancery and the
Delaware Supreme Court explicitly applied the Delaware Supreme
Court's reasoning in QVC in deciding the applicability of Revlon.2'
In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court held that if control re-
mains widely held, there is no change in control for Revlon pur-
poses.261 Moreover, that court also delineated specific circumstances
for when Revlon applies.265
In Arnold, Bank of Boston sought to enter into a merger agreement
with Society for Savings Bancorp.266 Bank of Boston offered to ac-
quire all of Bancorp by way of a stock swap, whereby Bancorp share-
holders would receive eight-tenths of a share of Bank of Boston
common stock for each share of Bancorp common stock.267 Both
Bancorp's board and shareholders approved the transaction.2 I Soon
after, Arnold, a minority shareholder of Bancorp, 9 brought suit al-
leging, among other things, that when the Bancorp board decided to
sell the company, Revlon required it to obtain the highest price for its
shareholders.2 70
As QVC suggested, the Chancery Court applied both a break-up
test and a change-in-control test in determining whether Revlon ap-
plied.2 71 After the court summarily concluded that neither of the
ime-Warner break-up scenarios was implicated, it went on to ex-
261. QVC also affirms prior Delaware caselaw allowing a target board to resist an
unsolicited offer. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 n.13 ( "[W]here a potential sale of control
by a corporation is not the consequence of a board's action, this Court has recognized
the prerogative of a board of directors to resist a third party's unsolicited acquisition
proposal or offer."). Yet, if in response to a bidder's threat, a target board seeks an
alternative transaction that may result in a break-up of the company, then, as in Rev-
Ion itself, a board will be subject to Revlon duties. See Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
262. Civ. A. No. 12883, 1993 WL 526781 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
263. Id- at *9-10.
264. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994).
265. Id.
266. Civ. A. No. 12883, 1993 WL 526781, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1993). The exact
structure of the transaction called for a Bank of Boston subsidiary to merge with
Bancorp.
267. Id at *2. At the time the board voted on the offer, the exchange rate trans-
lated into an offer of $17.30 per share for Bancorp's stockholders. Id.
268. Id at *2.
269. Arnold owned 300 shares of common stock of Bancorp. Id. at 1. Over 10
million shares of Bancorp were issued and outstanding at the time. Id. at *2.
270. Id. at *9. Arnold also alleged that Bancorp's board breached its fiduciary duty
of full disclosure during the period surrounding the merger. ld at "1.
271. Id. at *9-11.
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amine whether a change in control had occurred." z Like the QVC
court, the Chancery Court in Arnold focused on the control structure
of the corporation both before and after the merger.2 7 3 The Arnold
court found that both companies involved were publicly owned,
neither company had a controlling block of shares held by an individ-
ual, entity, or group, and nothing in the merger's structure suggested
any threat to the continuity of the Bancorp shareholders in the
merged entity.274 Thus, the Chancery Court concluded that, unlike
QVC, control would remain in a "large, fluid market of disaggregated
shareholders," both before and after the merger.275 The court there-
fore found that no change in control occurred and that Revlon duties
did not apply. 76
The Delaware Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in finding
that Revlon did not apply.2 77 The court first explained that presuma-
bly the term "Revlon duties" applied to a board's obligation to obtain
the best value reasonably available to shareholders. 78 The court then
explained when such duties apply:
The directors of a corporation "have the obligation of acting reason-
ably to seek the transaction offering the best value reasonably avail-
able to the stockholders" in at least the following three scenarios:
(1) "when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking
to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear
break-up of the company"; (2) "where, in response to a bidder's
offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alterna-
tive transaction involving the break-up of the company"; or (3)
when approval of a transaction results in a "sale or change of con-
trol." In the latter situation, there is no "sale or change in control"
when "'[c]ontrol of both [companies] remain[s] in a large, fluid,
changeable and changing market.' ,270
The court in Arnold, therefore, clearly sets forth the specific circum-
stances in which the duty to obtain the best value for shareholders
applies. While QVC enunciated that a break-up or change in control
272. Id. at *10.
273. Id. at *11.
274. It
275. Idi
276. ld The court also noted that "neither company had a large controlling block
of shares held by one individual or entity" and that "there is nothing in the Merger's
structure that suggests that the continuity of Bancorp's shareholders in the merged
entity is threatened." Id.
277. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994).
278. See id. at 1289 n.40. The court notes that the plaintiff refers to the phrase
"Revlon duties" and presumes that the phrase refers to the obligation to obtain the
best value reasonably available for shareholders. Id. at 1289 & n.40. Nonetheless, the
court did not use the phrase directly because it found that colloquialisms such as
"Revlon duties" are inappropriate in matters before Delaware courts. Id. at 1289 n.40.
279. Id. at 1289-90 (quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42-43, 47 (Del. 1993); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989)).
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triggers this obligation, Arnold explains that a "break-up" refers to
the two particular scenarios described in Time-Warner. Further, Ar-
nold affirms the principle articulated in QVC and Time-Warner-if
control remains widely held, a change in control for Revlon purposes
will not occur.2 0
Arnold thus depicts specifically how a widely held company can ac-
quire another widely held company without imposing Revlon duties
upon the target board. In Arnold, because control remained widely
held, even though the control structure changed, Bancorp was under
no duty to maximize shareholder value. This holding illustrates that,
despite Revlon, boards have some flexibility in structuring a merger.
Because Arnold delineates specifically the Revlon-triggering circum-
stances, a board should be able to determine how it may structure a
transaction without implicating Revlon.
Ill. REvzoLN DuTms IN THE MID-1990S
The evolution of Revlon into the 1990s, as illustrated by the
caselaw, reveals developments as to Revlon's triggers and content. At
first, Revlon duties were characterized as an auction duty, requiring a
board to obtain the highest price for shareholders and to sell the com-
pany to the highest bidder.2 1 Subsequent courts, however, clarified
that an auction is not required and that a board should consider fac-
tors besides the dollar amount of a bid in determining the best value
for shareholders. Now, mid-decade, when a board's Revlon duties ap-
ply, the board's obligation is to seek "the best value reasonably avail-
able to the stockholders"'-" rather than merely obtain the highest
dollar amount. Therefore, Revlon duties are not as radical as they
originally appeared, and boards have some flexibility in structuring
280. See Thomas A. Gentile, Refining the Revlon Doctrine's Applicability to
Changes of ControL Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34 (DeL 1993), 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 895, 906 (1994) ("When there is an
effective transfer of control to a fluid aggregate of unaffiliated public stockholders,
[the Chancery Court in] Arnold held, there is no legal change of control and Revlon
duties do not apply."). This finding in Arnold completely affirms prior Delaware
caselaw. In Tune-Warner, the transaction was structured so that Warner stockholders
would own 62% of Time-Warner after the merger, further, no change in control was
found in that, as in Arnold, control was vested in a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated
shareholders. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. Moreover, this ration-
ale was cited approvingly in QVC, which based its finding of a change in control on
the fact that control of the corporation passed out of the public's hands and into the
hands of Sumner Redstone. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46-47 (Del. 1993). Thus, even though, in Arnold, Bank of Boston
ended up owning 100% of the merged entity's stock, because Bank of Boston was a
widely held public corporation, control of Bancorp remained widely held by unaffili-
ated public stockholders, and thus no change of control for Revlon purposes was
found. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Civ. A. No. 12883, 1993 W'L 526781, at
*11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
281. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
282. QVC, 637 A.2d at 46 (emphasis added).
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mergers. The Chancery Court in QVC made such an observation,
stating that "Delaware corporations should be and are free to enter
into strategic combinations" and that "[ijf Revlon in anyway restricts
that freedom, it is only to the extent necessary to assure that the fun-
damental interests of the corporation's [shareholders] are
protected."' 3
After Revlon's original implementation in the context of a "break-
up" of a company, courts soon applied Revlon to the "change in con-
trol" of a corporation. Subsequently, after much dispute as to which
of the two standards was proper, the court in QVC instructed that
both scenarios may impose Revlon duties upon directors.2z
An examination of the "break-up" and change-in-control standards
demonstrates precisely which situations are likely to trigger Revlon.
Under QVC and Arnold, a board can avoid Revlon duties by either
implementing structural devices restricting the power of a potential
controlling shareholder or by avoiding transactions resulting in a con-
trolling person, entity, or cohesive group.
A. Triggering Revlon
To determine what will trigger Revlon at mid-decade, one must ex-
tract principles from the caselaw. In QVC, the Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that when a board undertakes a transaction that will
cause either a change in control or the break-up of the corporate en-
tity, the directors' obligation is to seek the best value reasonably avail-
able to the stockholders.2 5 The court in Arnold clarified that a
"break-up" refers to the two "break-up" scenarios articulated in Time-
Warner. Those situations are: (1) "when a corporation initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reor-
ganization ' 28 6 and (2) "where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction
involving the breakup of the company."' These situations stem from
the language in Revlon that the "break-up" of the company had be-
come "inevitable. '"m They also reflect the concern in Revlon that, in
a bidding contest or a break-up, directors must act in a neutral manner
to obtain the best value for shareholders.289 When a target board
faces an unsolicited offer, if it seeks out an alternative transaction, as
283. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1267
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
284. QVC, 637 A.2d at 47-48.
285. l at 46.
286. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1989).
287. Id
288. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1985).
289. See id. at 184.
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in Revlon, then it must obtain the best value reasonably available to
the shareholders.2"
While the Time-Warner scenarios describe which situations may
constitute a "break-up" for Revlon purposes, the Delaware courts
provide little guidance as to what constitutes a change of control.
Although the Delaware Supreme Court has explained that there will
be no change in control for Revlon purposes if a company remains
widely held without a controlling shareholder, it remains unclear pre-
cisely what constitutes control. Nonetheless, certain developments in
Delaware caselaw clarify, to an extent, what constitutes a change of
control in some situations.
To control a corporation, one need not own a majority of its
shares.291 In large public corporations, owning a large block generally
constitutes control.2" Whether effective control will suffice for Rev-
lon purposes has been uncertain for some time.293 Yet, in Mills Acqui-
sition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,294 the Delaware Supreme Court
characterized the transfer of thirty-nine percent of a target company's
outstanding stock into management's hands as a sale of control. 9 In
light of Macmillan, it appears that one does not need majority owner-
ship, but only effective control for Revlon purposes.2" There is, how-
ever, no precise amount that constitutes control, and, because each
transaction is different, a bright line test may be unworkable. None-
theless, incorporating a presumption of control at some level of own-
ership is helpful in understanding what constitutes control.
Although it has not been cited for Revlon purposes, the Delaware
General Corporation Law provides that an owner of twenty percent
or more of a corporation's voting stock is presumed to have "control"
of such corporation.29 The American Law Institute's Principles of
290. See id. A target board, however, may reject all offers and keep itself in-
dependent, without worrying about Revlon. See supra note 261.
291. See supra note 125.
292. See supra note 125.
293. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Fiduciary Duties of Directors in Ne-
gotiating Mergers, N.Y.LJ., April 14, 1994, at 6.
294. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
295. Id- at 1270, 1285.
296. One might argue that QVC requires majority ownership for control QVC
states that a change in control occurs when a single person, entity, or group acquires a
majority of a company's voting shares. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Net-
work Inc., 637 A.2d 34,42 (Del. 1993). Nonetheless, the court in QVC had no need to
mention whether effective control would suffice because it found that the change in
control in that case was "crystal clear." See id. at 51.
297. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (1991). While the definition of "control" in
section 203(c) contains the caveat, "[a]s used in this section only," section 203 is enti-
tled "Business combinations with interested stockholders," which by its title alone
seems to suggest the relevance of its definition of "control" to takeover situations,
especially whereas "control" is not defined elsewhere in the statute. Section 203(c)(4)
reads in pertinent part:
"Control," including the term "controlling," "controlled by" and "under
common control with," means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the
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Corporate Governance298 also discusses control. The ALI definition is
similar to that of the Delaware statute, although the ALI requires
holdings of twenty-five percent for there to be a presumption of con-
trol.299 Nevertheless, these numbers are merely presumptions that do
not seem to have found their way into the Revlon analysis. Indeed, in
American General Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc.,300 where the board facilitated
an alleged control group's acquisition of twenty-eight percent of Uni-
trin, the Chancery Court found that the transaction did not result in a
change in control. °1
In Unitrin, the board implemented a repurchase plan that, plaintiffs
contended, resulted in the board's ownership of Unitrin increasing
from twenty-three percent to twenty-eight percent of the outstanding
shares.3 2 The plan thereby gave the board members, acting together,
the power to block a merger. 0 3 Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued
that this increase of the "Insider Group's" stake in Unitrin consti-
tuted a change in control that implicated Revlon.3 4 In evaluating the
transaction, the Chancery Court concluded that, although the transac-
tion intended to give the directors the power to block a merger, it did
not constitute a change in control.30 5 The Chancery Court based this
decision on the fact that the public shareholders retained some con-
trol30 6 and still had the possibility of receiving a control premium for
their shares.30 7 It noted that a controlling stockholder often has far
power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person, whether through the ownership of voting stock, by contract or other-
wise. A person who is the owner of 20% or more of a corporation's out-
standing voting stock shall be presumed to have control of such corporation,
in the absence of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary.
Id. For example, this presumption of control would most easily be rebuttable by a
situation in which there existed another significant shareholder. See Solomon et al.,
supra note 3, at 1138.
298. American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations (1994).
299. Id at § 1.08.
300. Civ. A. Nos. 13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994), rev'd on
other grounds, No. 418, 1994, 1995 WL 12461 (Del. Jan. 11, 1995).
301. Id. at *5.
302. Id. at *3.
303. Id at *3. This was the case because of a supermajority voting provision in
Unitrin's certificate of incorporation. Id.
304. Id at *4.
305. Id at *5.
306. Id ("The repurchase program ... will not deprive the public stockholders of
'the power to influence corporate direction through the ballot.'" (quoting Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993))).
307. Id. ("The plaintiffs have failed to show that the stockholder directors could
sell their expected holdings at the close of the repurchase program for a control pre-
mium and forever deprive the public stockholders of the premium they now own.").
The court also noted that "[tihe stockholder directors will acquire control over the
decision whether to sell Unitrin, but the public stockholders will still receive their
control premium if those directors decide to sell." Id
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more power than the single ability to block a merger.3 s For example,
the controlling stockholder in QVC had the power, among other
things, to elect a majority of the board, amend the certificate of incor-
poration, and enter into a merger.Y In Unitrin, the Chancery Court
concluded, the directors, with their twenty-eight percent, had none of
these powers, only the power to block a merger.?1 Accordingly, the
power to block a merger alone does not constitute control.
The Chancery Court in Unitrin, however, neglected to address that
the board's repurchase plan, increasing the groups ownership to
twenty eight percent, might, on its own, constitute a transfer of effec-
tive control.311 The case law indicates that effective control will suf-
fice for Revlon purposes.312 The Chancery Court in Unitrin only
concluded that the director group had none of the powers of the con-
trolling stockholder in QVC. Those powers, however, were the pow-
ers of majority ownership.31 3 Thus, the court left little guidance as to
whether the board's twenty-eight percent could constitute effective
control.
While what constitutes effective control is uncertain, boards should
be wary of entering into transactions transferring an amount close to
thirty-nine percent because, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc. ,314 the Delaware Supreme Court found that amount to constitute
control.315 Although the definition in DGCL section 203 has not been
applied to a Revlon case, a change in control probably should not oc-
cur if the transaction does not result in a shareholder or group holding
more than twenty percent of the merged entity.316
Additionally, any transfer that is deemed a change of control will
suffice for Revlon purposes.3 17 The court in Macmillan made clear
that Revlon would apply in such a situation, whether a sale takes the
308. I& The court stated-
In QVC, the controlling stockholder would have been able to: "(a) elect
directors; (b) cause a break-up of the corporation; (c) merger it with another
company; (d) cash-out the public stockholders; (e) amend the certificate of
incorporation; (f) sell all or substantially all of the corporate assets; or (g)
otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation and the public stock-
holders' interest."
Id (quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43
(Del. 1993)).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See id
312. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
313. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,43 (Del.
1993).
314. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
315. See id. at 1285.
316. Because of the imprecision involved in what constitutes control, it is possible,
however, that a court might even find a stockholder with less than 20% ownership as
having effective controL
317. See NMlls Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A2d 1261, 1285 (DeL 1988).
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form of an active auction, a management buyout, or a restructuring.318
Nonetheless, even if such a transfer occurs, a board can implement
various measures to obviate the possibility of a court imposing Revlon
duties.
B. Avoiding Revlon Duties Through Structural Devices
In QVC, the court noted that a board can structure a transaction so
that the presence of a controlling shareholder need not trigger Rev-
lon.3 19 Accordingly, a board may consider various structural devices,
such as supermajority voting provisions or limiting board representa-
tion.32° In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,32' where the
board facilitated a shareholder increasing its stake in Newmont from
26% to 49.7%, the court found that Revlon was not triggered because
of a ten-year standstill agreement that limited that shareholder to a
maximum of 49.9% of the stock and 40% representation on
Newmont's board.322 While 49.9% is clearly effective control, the
court found no change in control because the standstill agreement
vested control in the minority shareholders. 323 Despite the share-
holder's ownership of 49.7%, the standstill agreement gave the re-
maining shareholders the power to elect 60% of the board members
and thereby retain control of the corporation. 2 4
Thus, a provision immediately limiting a controlling stockholder's
board representation may help to avoid Revlon because it protects
minority interests.325 Such a covenant truly must limit that share-
holder's power. For example, in a transaction resulting in a control-
ling stockholder, a covenant requiring that shareholder to lessen
ownership to twenty percent within two years would not avoid Revlon
because it does not protect minority shareholders.326 In the period
318. Id.
319. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42
n.12 (Del. 1993) (citing with approval Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), where the court found that a transaction protecting minor-
ity stockholder interests by limiting a 49.9% stockholder to 40% board representation
did not trigger Revlon).
320. See id.
321. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
322. See id. at 1345.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42
n.12 (Del. 1993).
326. See Preserving A Friendly Merger: Top M&A lawyers debate how the Para-
mount battle will affect future mergers, American Law. Corp. Couns. Mag., Summer
1994, at 86-87 (describing a colloquy between A. Gilchrist Sparks, III and Martin
Lipton discussing this situation, in which Sparks concludes that even if the minority
stockholders remained unprotected for one day, as opposed to two years, that control
would pass and trigger Revlon).
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before ownership is reduced, that shareholder could exploit the
minority.
3 2 7
The concern, as explained in QVC, is that "[i]n the absence of de-
vices protecting the minority stockholders, stockholder votes are
likely to become mere formalities where there is a majority stock-
holder.' '31 Generally, in the absence of such a controlling stock-
holder, one's stock in a company represents both one's ownership and
control of the corporation. Therefore, when a board facilitates the
emergence of a controlling shareholder, minority shareholders are en-
titled to a "control premium and/or protective devices of significant
value" for their loss of decision-making power in the corporation. 9
Revlon duties represent the control premium aspect of this compensa-
tion for a loss of control-seeking the best value reasonably available
for shareholders is obtaining the control premium they deserve. Pro-
tective devices, which preserve the control aspect of share ownership,
abrogate the need for such a control premium and for Revlon duties,
because control remains with the minority shareholders.
In light of these concerns, a board seeking to avoid Revlon duties
should attempt to structure a transaction to curtail the power of a po-
tential controlling stockholder. There are no specific structural de-
vices that a board must employ, providing that they actually protect
minority shareholders once a controlling shareholder emerges. If a
board can ensure that minority stockholders retain some control of
the corporation, then it is less likely that a court will find a change in
control. As a result, absent a break-up, Revlon duties should not be
triggered.
327. See id.
328. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42 (footnote omitted).
329. See id at 43. Although QVC speaks in terms of protecting minority share-
holder interests when there is a majority shareholder, this may be a difficult task as
mere majority status generally carries with it true control, as opposed to the de facto
control of a significant shareholder. In other words, based on the rationale in QVC, it
seems that protective devices will not avoid a change in control when the resulting
shareholder owns more than 50% of the merged entity. This is evidenced by the
provisions of the standstill agreement in Newmont, which limited the shareholder to
acquiring 49.9% of Newmont's stock. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987). A recent article also made this observation:
Where post-merger ownership by a single stockholder or stockholder group
is less than 50%, the imposition of minority stockholder status and removal
of a potential control premium from public shares that motivated adoption
of the change of control test may be so attenuated that enhanced judicial
scrutiny may be found unnecessary. In this regard, the Court [in QVC] sug-
gested that supermajority voting provisions or standstill agreements may suf-
ficiently limit the control value of a significant block of post-merger stock so
that the change of control test does not come into play.
A. Gilchrist Sparks, m et al., New Developments: The Business Judgment Rule in
Contests for Control Under Delaware Law, C938 ALI-ABA 329, 375 (1994) (citation
omitted).
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C. Avoiding Revlon by Keeping Ownership of a Merged Entity
Widely Held
While protective devices are helpful to curtail what is otherwise
deemed a change in control, a corporation may avoid a potential
change-in-control situation altogether by ensuring that ownership of
the post-merger entity remains widely held.330 QVC specifically sup-
ports this rationale because it requires a transfer of control out of the
public stockholders' hands to constitute a change in control for Rev-
lon.331 Further, such a notion would be consistent with the policy be-
hind conferring a control premium to shareholders who are giving up
control.332 In a situation like QVC, where a single shareholder would
own a majority of the shares of the merged entity, the voting power of
the resulting minority shareholders is diminished significantly.333 In-
deed, when a single shareholder owns a majority of a corporation's
shares, regardless of how many additional shares a minority share-
holder acquires, the minority shareholder will have no power in cer-
tain matters of corporate governance.3 4
By contrast, in a situation like Time-Warner, where Warner share-
holders owned sixty-two percent of the merged entity, the merged en-
tity's shares remained widely held by the public. 335 Although the
merger may dilute their ownership stake, any shareholders who
purchased additional shares would increase their control in the corpo-
ration proportionately. The Chancery Court in Time-Warner ex-
plained the concern:
The existence of a block of stock in the hands of a single share-
holder or a group with loyalty to each other does have real conse-
quences to the financial value of "minority" stock. The law offers
some protection to such shares through the imposition of a fiduciary
duty upon controlling shareholders .... The shareholders of [the
target company] would have "suffered" dilution, of course, but they
would suffer the same type of dilution upon the the [sic] public dis-
tribution of new stock. 33
Therefore, as long as control of the corporation remains widely held,
there is no need for a control premium, as control remains in the
330. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994).
331. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
332. In QVC, the court emphasized that when shareholders give up control in a
corporation, they are entitled to a control premium and/or protective devices of sig-
nificant value. Id. at 43.
333. Id
334. I& at 42 ("In the absence of devices protecting the minority stockholders,
stockholder votes are likely to become mere formalities where there is a majority
stockholder." (footnote omitted)).
335. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149-51 (Del.
1989).
336. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,280 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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hands of the public. In light of the concerns expressed in QVC and
Time-Warner, it is no surprise that the Delaware Supreme Court, in
Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp,337 explicitly endorsed this re-
sult.338 In that case, the court approved the outright acquisition of all
of the shares of a company by way of a stock-for-stock merger.33 9 It
held that Revlon duties do not apply to a target board in such a situa-
tion providing that control " 'remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable
and changing market.' "I
This language in QVC, Time-Warner, and Arnold is immensely
helpful to corporate planners. Directors structuring mergers are more
likely to succeed in avoiding Revlon duties if control of the merged
entity remains widely held.31' If control changes from the public to a
"single person or entity, or... cohesive group acting together,"3 2
then, as in QVC, a court may impose Revlon duties upon a board. u s
Accordingly, while widely held corporations are less restricted in en-
tering into transactions, companies dominated by a single shareholder
may be able to merge only through the application of Revlon duties or
by implementing structural devices to avoid Revlon. A board there-
fore must be conscious of who will have control of the post-merger
corporation, as the make-up of the parties themselves will affect the
outcome of transaction.
For example, suppose a group of investors formed a corporation
with the intention of acquiring other companies. Further, suppose
that the corporation then wished to purchase a controlling interest in a
widely held public company, and the directors of that company agreed
to such a transaction. Because a court would likely see the acquiring
company as a "cohesive group acting together,"'' s the directors of the
target company would be obliged under Revlon to ensure that the
transaction offered the best value reasonably available to sharehold-
ers. Revlon duties would apply here because the public shareholders
would lose their decision making power once this group acquired
control.
337. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
338. Id at 1289-90.
339. Id
340. Id at 1290 (quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1993)).
341. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Delaware Court Revisits 'Unocal'
and 'Revlon', N.Y.LJ., Feb. 16, 1995, at 5, 7 ("Arnold reaffirms that Revlon duties do
not attach when control of the merged company remains in a fluid market and the
possibility of shareholders receiving a control premium in the future is not
foreclosed.").
342. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
343. This conclusion, that that Revlon is not triggered providing control remains
widely held by the public, may indeed be a powerful one. Its plain terms license
stock-for-stock acquisitions by widely held companies, providing that the acquiring
company, and thus the resulting merged entity, is not dominated by a controlling
shareholder.
344. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
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On the other hand, suppose one widely held public corporation
wished to acquire another, giving the target company's shareholders
stock in the acquiring company in consideration for their shares. Fur-
ther, suppose the transaction would not result in a controlling share-
holder or group. These facts fit squarely under both Time-Warner and
Arnold. Indeed, in Arnold, the acquiring corporation acquired all of
the outstanding shares of the target by way of a stock-for-stock
merger. 345 Here, Revlon would not be triggered because control re-
mains widely held. A less clear case would present itself if the trans-
action resulted in a shareholder who owned thirty-five percent of the
corporation. Obviously, these facts present the question of whether
thirty-five percent constitutes control. Specific facts of such a case
would determine the answer. For example, a court probably would
consider whether or not there were any structural provisions in place
for the protection of minority shareholders. This example would be
even less predictable if thirty-five percent represented the combined
holdings of certain people alleged to be a "group." What constitutes a
group, like what constitutes control, may be difficult to ascertain. 6
Because of the ambiguity inherent in what constitutes control, a
board may best situate itself by ensuring that control of a post-merger
entity remains widely held. Only borderline cases, such as the exam-
ple given above, present predictability problems. Otherwise, in a
transaction that has no possible controlling shareholder, the threat of
Revlon, absent a break-up, should not exist. Stock-for-stock mergers
among widely held equals, therefore, should not be problematic?47
Thus, a board may avoid changes in control and Time-Warner's
"break-up" scenarios through careful board action. Target boards
must be careful when entertaining offers from acquiring companies
that are closely held. Even if a target might favor a combination with
such an acquiror, entertaining its bids may subject the target to Revlon
duties. Likewise, acquiring companies should be aware that if they
have a controlling stockholder, their merger plans may be more lim-
ited. Therefore, if a board wishes to avoid the type of change-in-con-
trol situation likely to trigger Revlon, it obviously should avoid
transactions that might result in a controlling stockholder or group.
By preserving the widely held aspect of a post-merger entity, directors
will afford themselves much more freedom in structuring a transaction
as, absent a break-up, Revlon is less likely to apply.
345. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1274-75 (Del. 1994).
346. See American Gen. Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc., Civ. A. Nos. 13656, 13699, 1994 WL
698483, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994) (discussing whether a board of directors, with
combined holdings of 28% of its corporation, constitutes an "Insider Group"), rev'd
on other grounds, No. 418, 1994, 1995 WL 12461 (Del. Jan. 11, 1995).
347. See Martin Lipton & Theodore N. Mirvis, 10 Questions and Answers Raised by
Delaware 'Paramount' Decision, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 10, 1994, at 1, 5 (noting that after
QVC, a company can enter into a merger of equals, in which neither company gets a
premium).
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CONCLUSION
Revlon duties, requiring a board to obtain the best value reasonably
available to shareholders, still exist in Delaware corporate law. There
is no single method, however, for fulfilling those duties. Boards need
not conduct an auction, but must be informed fully to ensure that a
transaction obtains the best value reasonably available to the share-
holders. Further, Revlon duties apply specifically when one of the
break-up scenarios listed in Time-Warner is involved or when the
board facilitates a sale or change in control of the corporation.
As the court in QVC explained, Revlon duties arise largely to pro-
tect minority shareholders when control is transferred from them.
Thus, a board may implement certain measures protecting minority
shareholders, such as supermajority voting or limiting board represen-
tation, so that a change in control for Revlon purposes may be
avoided. Perhaps a board's greatest freedom is the notion, approved
of in Time-Warner, QVC, and Arnold, that, absent a break-up, if con-
trol remains widely held, Revlon will not be triggered. By its applica-
tion in Arnold, this conclusion licenses stock-for-stock acquisitions by
widely held companies. Even non-widely held companies, however,
have some freedom, as any board may implement structural devices.
Consequently, while Revlon duties could reduce a board's options in
structuring a transaction, Revlon duties are not inevitable in merger
situations and, through careful planning, may be avoided.
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